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ABSTRACT
This Article critiques the borrowing of private law concepts to develop doctrines of judicial
review in public law.  A rising chorus of scholars has argued for a fiduciary theory of government
designed to constrain political discretion through judicial review based upon the model of private
fiduciary duties.  Treating politicians and bureaucrats as fiduciaries, they argue, promises a
workable judicial solution to the problem of faction in legislative and administrative decision-
making.  This Article argues the promise of fiduciary government is a false one.  There are
problems of fit, intent, and function with fiduciary government.  Politicians and bureaucrats are
not like private fiduciaries because they do not serve discrete classes of beneficiaries and are not
subject to demands that can be distilled into a discrete maximand.  Fiduciary government cannot
be founded in the intent of the Founders or of Congress.  Moreover, fiduciary government has not
functioned well where courts have experimented with it.  Either the analogy to fiduciary law
operates at such a high level of generality that it simply restates public law problems in different
terms, or it imports freestanding fiduciary principles that yield unworkable constraints on politi-
cal decisionmaking.  The failure of fiduciary government is instructive, however, on the promises
and potential pitfalls of translating between public and private law.
INTRODUCTION
Private law labels some relationships of power and dependence between
persons “fiduciary.”  With the label come duties, enforceable through private
rights of action, which aim to protect the beneficiaries of delegations of
power to others from becoming victims of that dependence.  To some, mod-
ern life is characterized by the emergence of a “society . . . based predomi-
nantly on fiduciary relations.”1  Understood thus, fiduciary law encompasses
not only the traditional doctrinal categories—trust, agency, partnership, cor-
porations, and so on—but also all “important social and economic interac-
tions of high trust and confidence that create an implicit dependency and
peculiar vulnerability of the beneficiary to the fiduciary.”2
The work of the antebellum scholar Francis Lieber reveals how far this
thinking can run.  Writing in 1838, Lieber lumped constitutional law with
1 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 798 (1983).
2 Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in
Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 933 (2011).
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trust law.3  Every citizen, from the federal postmaster to the local haber-
dasher, was a fiduciary.  The foundation of political duties, no less than that
of duties that run from trustee to trust beneficiary, could be found in fiduci-
ary law.
More recently, a rising chorus of contemporary scholars has begun to
argue for a model of government designed to constrain political discretion
through judicial review based upon the law of fiduciary duties.4  Like private
3 See Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in American Law, 10 CONST. COM-
MENT. 297, 305 (1993) (“For Lieber, Constitutional Law was a branch of the law of Trusts.”)
(discussing FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (William G. Hammond
ed., 1880) (1838) and FRANCIS LIEBER, II MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS (Theodore D. Wool-
sey ed., 1888)).
4 There are four strains to the contemporary fiduciary theory of government.  One
applies the fiduciary model to constitutional law. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as
Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 706–22 (2013); Mitchell F. Crusto, Obama’s Moral Capital-
ism: Resuscitating the American Dream, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1021–22 (2009); Robert G.
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1088–91 (2004) [here-
inafter Natelson, Public Trust]; Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 317–21 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Neces-
sary and Proper]; Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay
in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Natelson, General Wel-
fare]; Philip J. Levitz, A Modern Fiduciary Theory of the Necessary & Proper Clause (Aug.
21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014468.
Another looks to reform administrative law by reference to fiduciary theory. See, e.g., Jer-
emy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. L. REV. 721, 728 (2012); Evan J. Criddle,
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 441, 448 (2010) [hereinafter Criddle, Administration]; Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes
in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1271 (2010); Jessica Mantel, Procedural
Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L.
REV. 343, 359–65 (2009); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54
UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006) [hereinafter Criddle, Foundations].  Yet a third strain aims at
particular substantive areas of regulation.  Some envision a thorough overhaul of existing
regulatory approaches, particularly in the area of environmental and natural resources
regulation. See, e.g., FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST (Ken Coghill, Charles
Sampford, & Tim Smith eds., 2012); Peter Manus, To a Candidate in Search of an Environmen-
tal Theme: Promote the Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 360–61 (2000); Mary Christina
Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and
Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43
(2009) [hereinafter Wood, Part I]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a
Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91 (2009) [hereinafter Wood, Part II].
Others are more focused upon extensions of existing approaches, particularly in areas
where there is a risk of quid pro quo corruption or naked self-dealing. See, e.g., Kathleen
Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 57, 63; Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest
in Government and Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1640 (2011); Sung Hui Kim, The Last
Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013).  The fourth strain is more concerned with the political theory
of state authority and less with its doctrinal implications. See, e.g., EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOV-
EREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 347–59 (2009); Dimitrios Kyritsis,
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fiduciaries who owe duties to beneficiaries, public officials possess discretion-
ary authority to act on behalf of citizens, who cannot protect themselves from
abuse, or so the analogy runs.  By applying fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
to politicians and bureaucrats, fiduciary theorists aim to resolve the “problem
of faction” in political and bureaucratic decisionmaking.5  For example, fidu-
ciary theorists point to the duty of loyalty to check incumbent “self-dealing”
in legislative redistricting,6 or, paired with a “duty of impartiality,” to revive
substantive due process review of economic legislation.7  Another scholar
finds in fiduciary law six principles of judicial review that cut “strongly against
presidential administration” and in favor of substantial changes to federal
administrative law, including hard look review of every rulemaking and of
agency inaction, as well as disclosure of all agency communications with the
White House during rulemaking proceedings.8  There are other examples
including, perhaps most boldly, fiduciary theories that would rewrite McCul-
loch v. Maryland’s longstanding gloss on the Necessary and Proper Clause.9
In short, fiduciary theorists see in fiduciary law a political morality from
which to derive judicial constraints on political discretion.  By “drawing on
the lessons from private law enforcement of fiduciary duties,” the federal
courts can create a “workable approach” to judicial review of political deci-
sionmaking.10  That is the promise of fiduciary government.
This Article argues the promise of fiduciary government is a false one.
Fiduciary constraints are riven with problems even in the private law context,
where there is a consensus about the interests of beneficiaries and the ends
of judicial review.  Identifying when a fiduciary relationship exists is a matter
Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 733,
742–43 (2006); Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CAL. L. REV. 699, 712
(2013) [hereinafter Leib et al., Judging]; David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s
Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1255–61 (2011); Jedediah Purdy &
Kimberly Fielding, Sovereigns, Trustees, Guardians: Private-Law Concepts and the Limits of Legiti-
mate State Power, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2007); Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications,
Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1097–1109 (2008); Stephen B. Young, The Moral
Basis of American Law: An Hypothesis, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 649, 681 (2005).  Finally,
there is a literature exploring the theory of fiduciary government in other common law
countries. See, e.g., Paul Finn, Public Trust and Public Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224
(1994); P.D. Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND
TRENDS 131 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995); Lorne Sossin, From Neutrality to Compassion: The
Place of Civil Service Values and Legal Norms in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 427 (2005) [hereinafter Sossin, Neutrality]; Lorne Sossin, Public Fiduciary
Obligations, Political Trusts, and the Equitable Duty of Reasonableness in Administrative Law, 66
SASK. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Sossin, Obligations].
5 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
29–30 (1985) (comparing disparate areas of law, including Madisonian idea of factions,
while reflecting on the role of representatives).
6 Rave, supra note 4, at 679. R
7 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1170, 1177–78. R
8 Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 448, 486–87, 495. R
9 See Levitz, supra note 4, at 31–35; Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 4, at 246. R
10 Rave, supra note 4, at 739. R
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of significant debate.  Even where fiduciary constraints are well accepted—
from trust to corporate law—specifying their content sparks more disagree-
ment.  Indeed, some scholars have argued fiduciary law is dead.11  Hence, we
face an irony.  While private law scholars chart the decline and indetermi-
nacy of fiduciary constraints and the rise of private discretion, public law
scholars look to fiduciary law to constrain public discretion.  Yet designing
fiduciary rights and duties is even more difficult in the public law context,
where, unlike its private counterpart, there is not a consensus about the
interests of beneficiaries and the ends of judicial review.
As a result, the fiduciary model suffers a kind of Goldilocks problem.
Taken for all it suggests, fiduciary government would hold government to the
“punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”12  That constraint is simply too
much.  Unsurprisingly, fiduciary theorists have acknowledged the “uncom-
promising moralistic rhetoric” of fiduciary law and sought to restate public
fiduciary duties in compromising terms.13  But that approach provides too
little guidance.  Does it advance analysis, for example, to recast the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard of federal administrative law as a fiduciary duty of
care?  In either case, a court must still “calibrat[e] the degree of judicial def-
erence to be accorded” and the administrative procedure it will demand of
agencies.14
The problem lies in fiduciary doctrine itself.  Fiduciary law overlays mor-
alistic standards of conduct upon legally enforced norms, but what links the
two remains uncertain.  When it comes to corporate governance, for exam-
ple, judges act “more as preachers than as policemen.”15  Delaware corporate
law has a shadowy “penumbra,”16 with moral exhortations that “can never be
fully realized nor even defined with specificity in advance.”17  Importing fidu-
ciary law into constitutional and administrative law carries this indeterminacy
with it.
My arguments unfold as follows.  Part I elaborates the fiduciary theory of
government.  Part II discusses the problem of fit between private fiduciaries
and public officials.  The “hallmark” of a fiduciary relationship is an altruistic
duty requiring the fiduciary to be loyal to her beneficiary.18  This rule of
undivided loyalty gives rise to a distinctive set of rules of justiciability, primary
rights and duties, and remedies focused upon a discrete set of beneficiaries
11 See infra Section II.E.
12 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
13 Criddle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 133. R
14 CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 13 (1990).
15 Edward B. Rock, Saints & Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
16 Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1795 (2007).
17 John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992).
18 Carter G. Bishop, A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organization
Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 477, 480 (2006).
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and interests.  A trust, for example, involves a trilateral relationship among
the settlor, who creates the trust, the trustee, who administers it, and the trust
beneficiaries.  Trust law directs the trustee to resolve conflicts of interest by
reference to the settlor’s intent and to a well-understood set of economic
principles regarding the management of trust assets.  By contrast, networks
among politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens are multifarious.  Much debate
in political life and public law concerns not the means but the ends of regula-
tion.  There is no single maximand that a public official must pursue, and no
generally accepted means for her to pursue it.  Moreover, to the extent fidu-
ciary relationships are contractual, and fiduciary duties are default terms,
they provide poor guides to public law.
Part III explains the problem of intent with fiduciary government.  Federal
courts do not have unfettered authority to enforce freestanding fiduciary
constraints on Congress and the executive as a matter of federal common
law.  And the interpretive case for public fiduciary law is ultimately uncon-
vincing.  The absence of fiduciary precedent is compelling evidence against
the theory.  The Founders, to be sure, spoke of public office as a “public
trust” and were concerned with limiting “corruption,” defined broadly to
include “conscious or reckless abuse of the position of trust.”19  But it is far
from clear that fiduciary government was a background understanding of
legal rights at the Founding.  When the Founders raised the theory of fiduci-
ary government, they often did so in connection with political mechanisms—
chiefly impeachment and elections—for holding government officials
responsible for breaches of the public trust.  And whatever its persuasiveness
as an account of Founding Period political theory, fiduciary government can-
not explain the political compromise at the center of the charter of federal
administrative law, the Administrative Procedure Act.
Part IV lays out the problem of function with fiduciary government.  To test
the promise of fiduciary government, it makes sense to look at the public law
contexts where federal lawmakers have experimented with fiduciary analo-
gies, including the honest services statute,20 the STOCK Act,21 First Amend-
ment public forum doctrine, the public trust doctrine in environmental and
natural resources law, and the Indian trust doctrine.  The results do not com-
mend fiduciary government.  The connection of fiduciary duties to constitu-
tional values is opaque at best.  In many cases, fiduciary government has
served as a shield for government defendants, not as a sword for private
plaintiffs.  In other cases, the model aggrandizes judicial authority at the
expense of the daily operations of government.  Moreover, it is difficult to
distill a limiting principle for public fiduciary duties.
Part V shows that the problems of fit, intent, and function arise with
respect to three proposed fiduciary reforms.  Fiduciary government is attrac-
19 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 374, 378
(2009).
20 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
21 The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK Act), Pub. L. 112–105,
126 Stat. 291 (2012).
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tive as a theory of political ethics.  But the fiduciary metaphor does not
advance the analysis of troubling problems in public law, or so Part V argues.
Which is to say politics is not a problem to be solved by collapsing public
into private law.  Part VI considers the problem of translating between public
and private law.  Taking fiduciary government as an example, Part VI argues
that the success of translation depends upon recognizing the interdepen-
dence of justiciability, rights, and remedies, mediating between general prin-
ciples and decision rules in particular cases, and identifying the logical
connections between the values at stake in the relevant doctrinal debates.
Along all three metrics, fiduciary government fails to fulfill its promise of a
workable approach to constitutional and administrative law.  The analogy to
fiduciary law either imports freestanding fiduciary principles that yield
unworkable constraints on political decisionmaking or operates at such a
high level of generality that it simply restates public law problems in different
terms.
I. THE THEORY OF FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT
To take seriously the theory of fiduciary government means to “hold gov-
ernment officials and employees, including policymakers, to standards analo-
gous to those imposed on private fiduciaries.”22  A fiduciary relationship
implies not only private rights and duties, but also private remedies.  The
fiduciary owes the beneficiary of the relationship a duty of loyalty and a duty
of care.  The duty of loyalty directs a fiduciary to act only in the beneficiary’s
interest.  And the duty of care requires the fiduciary competently to pursue
those interests.23
Fiduciary law is thus one response to the agency problem that arises
where one person (the fiduciary) is tasked with making decisions regarding
the interests of another (the beneficiary).  An agency relationship may be
desirable for any number of reasons, including to allow the principal to
devote time to other activities and to harness the specialized skills and knowl-
edge of another person to accomplish her goals.24  But with delegation
comes vulnerability.  Corporate managers may shirk, for instance, spending
more time on the golf course than in the boardroom, or, worse still, self-deal
at the expense of the shareholders.  They may be negligent or reckless.  The
22 Robert G. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the
Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 193 (2001).
23 Whether the fiduciary relationship implies other judicially enforceable duties is a
matter of debate among private law scholars.  Some treat the duty of loyalty as the only
uniquely fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 209, 220–21.  Others enumerate additional duties. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, How Many
Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1234–35 (2010).  Yet a
third approach sees the duties of loyalty and of care as manifestations of the fiduciary’s
underlying duty of obedience.  Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty,
34 J. CORP. L. 43, 46 (2008).
24 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85
VA. L. REV. 1627, 1635 (1999).
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shareholders may not have the information, wherewithal, or incentives to
monitor manager misfeasance and malfeasance.  Similar problems can arise
in other relationships where one person is dependent upon the discretion of
another.  In such circumstances, private law sometimes imposes fiduciary
duties.
Fiduciary law is explicitly altruistic, not individualistic.  The classic treat-
ment remains then-Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s majority opinion in
Meinhard v. Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior.  As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate.25
Cardozo’s dictum frames the crucial divide between the altruists, who
consider moralizing rhetoric to be a defining feature of fiduciary law, and the
individualists, who treat fiduciary law as a species of contract law, subject to
nothing more than the morals of the market place.26  For the past three
decades, the individualists have offered an increasingly influential con-
tractarian account in which the duties of loyalty and care are “a method of
gap-filling in incomplete contracts.”27  To individualists, fiduciary duties are
preference-estimating default terms that reduce the transaction costs of bar-
gaining.  By contrast, like Cardozo, altruists do not account for fiduciary
duties in market terms.  To them, “fiduciary relationships are not contracts”
and the core fiduciary duties are not waivable or negotiable.28  The moraliz-
ing rhetoric of fiduciary law matters; even though courts do not enforce fidu-
ciary duties in an unyielding way, their exhortations encourage fiduciary
loyalty.29
Much the same debate animates the fiduciary turn in public law.  The
individualist conception, sometimes called “pluralism,” treats politics like a
marketplace.30  In this market, competing interest groups push, pull, grap-
25 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
26 Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99,
107–09 (2008).
27 Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Sharehold-
ers the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991); see
infra Section II.E (discussing contractarian account).
28 Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 305
(1999).
29 See, e.g., Anthony Duggan, Contracts, Fiduciaries, and the Primacy of the Deal, in EXPLOR-
ING PRIVATE LAW 275, 276 (Elise Bant & Matthew Harding eds., 2010) (discussing altruistic
account).  For a forceful and influential statement of altruism, see Frankel, supra note 1, at R
829–30 (“Courts regulate fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon
them.”).
30 In using the pluralist label, I follow Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Consti-
tution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692–93 (1984).  But scholars sometimes distinguish
between the “pluralist” political science of the 1960s and the public choice theory that
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ple, and horse trade their way to influence political and bureaucratic deci-
sionmakers to promote their pre-political preferences.  Public officials, for
their part, may aim at political spoils, such as reelection or bigger agency
budgets, not the public interest.  In this view, the role of institutional design
is to “filter[ ]” private interests in pursuit of the public good and to correct
for failures and barriers to entry in the political marketplace.31  Courts, for
example, should simply “police the processes of representation to ensure that
all affected interest-groups may participate.”32
The theory of fiduciary government both reflects and rejects the market
model.  With the pluralists, fiduciary theorists describe contemporary politi-
cal life as characterized by the tug and pull of competing interest groups.
But unlike the pluralists, fiduciary theorists aspire to public governance that
transcends normal politics and see an ambitious role for courts to hold politi-
cians and bureaucrats, no less than partners and agents, to something more
than market morality.
In a polity of any size, citizens cannot coordinate with one another to
achieve many public goods because the collective action barriers are too
high.33  Hence the demand for political agents.  Representatives can shoul-
der the burdens of policymaking, develop specialized skills and knowledge to
address public problems, and reduce the costs of achieving public goods.34
But for public officials to achieve these benefits, they must enjoy substantial
discretion.  They are tasked with meeting a goal—pursuing the public inter-
est—that is not easily defined, and thus not readily observable, and which
depends upon factors that may not be within an official’s control.
Political scientists have elaborated the resulting problems through prin-
cipal-agent theory.  Left unmonitored, politicians may be incompetent, lazy,
and the like.  But they may also pursue their self-interest through political
patronage, “the allocation of the discretionary favors of government in
exchange for political support.”35  Patronage can consist of quid pro quo
corruption and naked self-dealing or favoritism that aims to bolster a politi-
cian’s coalition for reelection or to achieve some other self-interested bene-
emerged in the 1970s.  Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administra-
tive Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1998).
31 See, e.g., Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib, The Political Morality of Voting in Direct Democ-
racy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1596, 1601–02 (2013).
32 Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1692–93.  The foundational account is George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
33 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS 9 (1971); see also Croley, supra note 30, at 18–20 (discussing collective
action problem).
34 See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 24, at 1635–37. R
35 Richard L. Hasen, An Enriched Economic Model of Political Patronage and Campaign
Contributions: Reformulating Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1311, 1311
(1993) (quoting MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, TO THE VICTOR . . . : POLITICAL
PATRONAGE FROM THE CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE 55 (1971)).
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fit.36  These agency problems are compounded in the administrative state,
where politicians delegate substantial discretion to bureaucrats, creating a
second layer of slack.  Bureaucrats may seek to maximize their agency budg-
ets, not the public interest, be captured by those they regulate, and so on.37
As in other agency contexts, two mechanisms may reduce these
problems: monitoring and bonding.38  Citizens may monitor public officials’
performance and sanction them for selfish or incompetent decisions.  Or
public officials may seek to assure their principals through bonding strategies
that precommit them to pursue the public interest.  But monitoring of politi-
cal principals by citizens, particularly at the federal level, may be “crude,” as
elections are infrequent, citizens have “very little information
about . . . candidates’ positions” and, in any event, “must  . . . vote for a mixed
bundle” of policy positions in any given election.39  And “[i]n a world in
which elected representatives are known to do things contrary to the appar-
ent preferences of their legal constituents,” voters may rightly be skeptical of
the durability of officials’ precommitments.40
To improve bonding and monitoring mechanisms and thus to address
the problem of faction, fiduciary theorists would extend the fiduciary meta-
phor from private law by treating politicians and bureaucrats as fiduciary
agents of the public (or some subset thereof).  In so doing, they would apply
the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, or both, to government officials.
Teddy Rave argues, for example, for stricter judicial review of electoral redis-
tricting because “[n]ational political parties” are “superfactions” that have
corrupted the districting process.41  Robert Natelson points to “widespread
sentiment that Congress is spending too much time ladling from the pork
barrel and conniving with the lobbyists thereby accommodated” as a reason
for a fiduciary prohibition upon special interest spending.42  Similarly, Evan
Criddle points to “the so-called ‘iron triangles’ between private industry,
agency administrators, and congressional committees, which institutionalize
factionalism” and thus lead to “decay into corruption, cronyism, capricious-
36 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 708 (1998) (discussing public choice assump-
tion that “elected officials are utility maximizers who pursue actions that maximize their
chance of reelection” (citing ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957))).
37 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971) (arguing that agency officials maximize utility by maximizing their budgets);
OLSON, supra note 33, at 3 (discussing capture of regulators by special interests); Rachel E. R
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15,
23 (2010) (discussing causes of capture).
38 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323–26 (1976).
39 Croley, supra note 30, at 38 (citing Stigler, supra note 32, at 12). R
40 Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 575 (1996).
41 Rave, supra note 4, at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
42 Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare
Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 242 (2007).
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ness, and waste.”43  In his view, the rise of presidential administration feeds
faction in federal administration, with the White House and the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) catering to SIGs (special interest
groups) rather than PIGs (public interest groups).44  The solution, Criddle
argues, is judicial review of federal administration by reference to six fiduci-
ary principles: “purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness,
and transparency.”45
In sum, fiduciary theory promises a workable scheme of judicially
enforceable rights and duties to constrain political agents to the aims of their
principals.  In particular, fiduciary theorists seek to limit special interest influ-
ence and presidentialism through robust judicial review of federal action
under the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act.
Thus, fiduciary theory hopes for a politics that is more than a nasty and
brutish marketplace.  It rejects raw power as a reason to deploy the coercive
power of the state, even as it describes normal politics in those terms.  It
acknowledges the obvious counter-majoritarian difficulty—that authorizing
fiduciary review of policymaking will lead to government by judiciary—by
pointing to the contextual nature of fiduciary duties and the possibility of
calibrating them to comport with the separation-of-powers principle.  Taking
the public trust seriously by treating officials as fiduciaries, they promise, will
prevent the polity’s “decay into corruption, cronyism, factionalism, capri-
ciousness, and waste.”46
It is tempting to dismiss fiduciary government as unrealistic.  It is reason-
able to wonder whether judicial review can transform the morals of the politi-
cal marketplace.  And it is reasonable to wonder whether federal judges
would act differently from their political counterparts.  There is wisdom in
this critique, but it is too easy.  There are enough reasons to doubt the mar-
ket model of politics,47 and the claim that judges decide cases based solely
upon naked preferences,48 to justify a sympathetic assessment of fiduciary
government.
43 Criddle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 147–48. R
44 See Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 464.  On SIGs and PIGs, see Roderick M. R
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2007).
45 Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 476. R
46 Criddle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 147. R
47 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 33 (1991) (“Our
best picture of the political process . . . is a mixed model in which constituent interest,
special interest groups, and ideology all help determine legislative conduct.”).
48 See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 9 (2007)
(reporting, based upon empirical analysis of federal courts of appeals, that “[l]egal rules
are much better determinants of outcomes than is judicial ideology,” while acknowledging
that “other aspects of judicial background” and “other judges on the panel matter”).
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II. THE PROBLEM OF FIT
What makes a government official a fiduciary?  Fiduciary theorists focus
upon the vulnerability of citizens that arises from a public official’s discre-
tion.  In brief, “public officials serve as fiduciary representatives for persons
subject to their power” because “[a]ll agents and instrumentalities of the
state . . . are vested by law with discretionary administrative powers” for the
public, who “is uniquely vulnerable to officers’ inept or unreasonable misuse
of administrative power.”49  Put simply, the state’s monopoly over making
and enforcing laws, and the people’s resulting vulnerability, give rise to a
fiduciary relationship.50
Descriptively, fiduciary theorists claim that public law doctrines are
grounded in a (largely implicit) fiduciary model of government.  Where that
is not the case, fiduciary theorists propose to reform public law.  In this Part,
I address the fiduciary theorists’ descriptive claim and call into question
whether the solutions to public law problems can be found in a formal anal-
ogy between private fiduciaries and public officials.
A. The Many Faces of Fiduciary Law
The fiduciary theorists’ altruistic account of the fiduciary concept is far
too neat.  On one view, the fiduciary relationship is “one of the most elusive
concepts in Anglo-American law,”51 more “a concept in search of a principle”
than a decision rule for assigning rights and duties in private law.52  One
definition—“a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another per-
son”—is both over- and under-inclusive.53  Another is taxonomic—a fiduci-
ary relationship is any relationship where one person controls another’s
property, or has an obligation to act for another, or has “undue influence”
over another, and so on—but not instructive.54  Yet a third would collapse
fiduciary law into contract,55 while a fourth would treat it as a species of prop-
erty.56  Perhaps “the only general assertion . . . that can be sustained” is that
fiduciary duties are appropriate when “one person’s discretion ought to be
49 Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 472–73. R
50 FOX-DECENT, supra note 4, at 111. R
51 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 879.
52 A.F. Mason, Themes and Prospects, in ESSAYS IN EQUITY 246 (P. Finn ed., 1985).
53 Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949); see D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1427
(2002).
54 L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 74–79.
55 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 426 (1993).
56 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1637 (2001).
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controlled because of characteristics of that person’s relationship with
another.”57
“And should I then presume?  And how should I begin?”58  Courts usu-
ally start by distinguishing between formal relationships that “give rise to a
fiduciary duty as a matter of law,” and informal fiduciary relationships, which
exist “as a result of the special circumstances of the parties’ relationship.”59
Generally speaking, the common law of the several states has settled upon a
list of traditional, formal fiduciary relationships that includes agents and
their principals, trustees and beneficiaries, business partners, corporate man-
agers and shareholders, guardians and their wards, and attorneys and their
clients.60  As for informal fiduciary relationships, the “exact limits . . . are
impossible of statement.”61  Many state courts employ a general standard, as
in, “[a]n implied fiduciary relationship will lie when there is a degree of
dependency on one side and an undertaking on the other side to protect
and/or benefit the dependent party.”62  Some have adopted multi-factor
tests,63 which others have rejected.64  Yet others have adopted presumptions
against finding informal fiduciary relationships, which are “extraordi-
nary . . . and will not be lightly created.”65
There is even more variation in the states’ treatment of fiduciary duties.
At a general level, the duty of loyalty requires fealty to the beneficiary and the
duty of care some modicum of competence.  These general principles hardly
prescribe decision rules for specific cases.  When it comes to applying the
principles, states vary, sometimes widely.  Consider, for example, the multifa-
57 DeMott, supra note 51, at 915.  DeMott seems to have relaxed that skepticism in R
later work. See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of
Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926 (2006).
58 T.S. Eliot, Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, lines 68–69, available at http://
www.bartleby.com/198/1.html (line break omitted).
59 Ransom v. A.B. Dick Co., 682 N.E.2d 314, 321–22 (Ill. App. 1997).
60 See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Ct., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860, 863–64 (Cal. App. 2003); Ransom,
682 N.E.2d at 321–22; Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009);
Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 843 N.E.2d 1058, 1064 (Mass. 2006); Gregan v. Kelly, 355 S.W.3d
223, 227 (Tex. App. 2011).
61 Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (N.Y. App. 1976).
62 Masztal v. City of Miami, 971 So. 2d 803, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see Auriga
Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., 40 A.3d 839, 850 (Del. Ch. 2012); Denison State Bank v.
Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982); Harbor Sch., 843 N.E. at 1064; Pool v. Farm
Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 311 S.W.3d 895, 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); EBC I,
Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31 (N.Y. 2005); Lippy v. Soc. Nat’l Bank, 651
N.E.2d 1364, 1368 (Ohio App. 1995); Moore v. Moore, 599 S.E.2d 467, 472 (S.C. Ct. App.
2004); Augusta Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mason, 645 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Va. 2007).
63 See, e.g., Wright v. Roberts, 797 So. 2d 992, 998 (Miss. 2001) (listing seven-factor
test); see also Ransom, 682 N.E.2d at 322 (listing three factors).
64 See, e.g., City of Hope Nat. Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 181 P.3d 142, 151–52 (Cal.
2008) (rejecting attempt to reduce fiduciary relationships to multi-factor test).
65 Gregan v. Kelly, 355 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. App. 2011); cf. Ransom, 682 N.E.2d at
321–22 (requiring clear and convincing evidence).
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rious state regimes regulating limited liability companies.66  All of which is to
ask of fiduciary theorists who would impose fiduciary duties on public offi-
cials: Which duties?
The question is not rhetorical.  Fiduciary law is built around the axiom
that “[t]he foremost duty which a fiduciary owes to its beneficiary is undi-
vided loyalty.”67  Translating from that context to public governance is hardly
straightforward.  And to the extent that fiduciary constraints are in decline in
private law, it is worth asking whether the game is worth the candle.
What is the resolving power of the analogy of public officials to private
fiduciaries?  At one level of analysis, fiduciary law is thin rather than thick.  It
offers abstract concepts rather than decision rules.  Natelson, for example,
enumerates five fiduciary principles that may apply to government conduct:
“(1) the duty to follow instructions, (2) the duty of reasonable care, (3) the
duty of loyalty, (4) the duty of impartiality, and (5) the duty to account.”68
Similarly, Criddle identifies six principles by which to judge federal adminis-
trative rulemaking: “purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonable-
ness, and transparency.”69  Almost no one would disagree that government
should act purposefully, reasonably, fairly, and so on.  But if that is all the
fiduciary analogy offers, then it largely restates existing questions regarding
judicial review of legislative and administrative action.
Treating the analogy between public officials and fiduciaries as thick
rather than thin promises to resolve some of these questions.  Two principles
animate fiduciary law.  First, private fiduciaries owe a single beneficiary or a
discrete class of beneficiaries a duty of undivided loyalty.  It is difficult, how-
ever, to specify how politicians and bureaucrats are fiduciaries for a discrete
class of beneficiaries.  Second, in discharging her duties, the fiduciary must
pursue one or a set of agreed-upon ends, which are measured by a specific set
of doctrinal maximands.  By contrast, in public law there is no agreement
upon specific maximands.  This distinction is significant because the exis-
tence of a rough consensus on specific ends mediates between the general,
indeterminate concepts of “loyalty” and “care” and the outcomes that courts
reach in fiduciary litigation.  As a result, the thick analogy between private
fiduciaries and public officials fails as a formal matter, whether the analogue
is the parent-child, trustee-beneficiary, or corporate manager-shareholder
relationship.
B. Public Officials as Parents
Some modern fiduciary theorists analogize public officials to parents.  In
particular, they draw upon Immanuel Kant’s conception of private fiduciary
duties as elaborated through his famous example of the parent-child relation-
66 See Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More
Than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 568 (2007).
67 Ledbetter v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1996).
68 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1088. R
69 Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 476. R
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ship.70  A parent owes his child a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty, Kant
argues, not because the child has delegated authority to the parent.  The
child has no choice.  It is that vulnerability, and the natural power a parent
has either to act in his child’s best interest or not, Kant reasons, which gives
rise to a fiduciary obligation running from parent to child.71  Observe, the
argument runs, that government officials possess discretionary power over
the citizenry and that citizens are vulnerable to wrongful exercises of power.
From this structural similarity springs the analogy between parents and pub-
lic officials.72
One obvious objection is that the analogy is paternalistic.  Parents may
not be dictators, but that’s not far off, as the law gives them extraordinarily
wide latitude over their children.  A parent can instruct a child when to sleep
and when to wake up; what to wear; how to style his or her hair; where to go
to school, and where to worship; what to believe and to think, and so on.73
Courts—particularly federal courts—are generally loath to question these
decisions, presuming instead “that natural bonds of affection lead parents to
act in the best interests of their children,” who lack the “maturity, experi-
ence, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult
decisions.”74
Perhaps less obvious is the objection that, as a matter of doctrine, the
parent-child relationship does not, without more, give rise to fiduciary duties
of loyalty and care.  That is true under federal law.75  And it is true under
state law too.  The Kansas Supreme Court has explained, “The mere relation-
ship of parent and child does not raise a presumption of a confidential and
fiduciary relationship.”76  Similarly, the Connecticut Court of Appeals has
opined, “The relationship between a parent and a child does not per se give
rise to the establishment of a fiduciary relationship.”77  Or, as the Illinois
court of appeals put it: “The mother and daughter relationship alone does
not create a fiduciary status.”78  In some settings, parents may have limited
70 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 352–55.
71 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 64–65 (Mary J. Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge University Press 1996) (1797).
72 See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 355 (“Applying the fiduciary principle, R
states are no more at liberty to deny jus cogens than parents are at liberty to deny the
fiduciary obligations that accompany parenthood.”).
73 See Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due Process, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 123, 125
(1999) (giving non-exhaustive list of parental rights).
74 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion).
75 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[M]ore than the
gratuitous reposal of a secret to another who happens to be a family member is required to
establish a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence.”).
76 Olson v. Harshman, 668 P.2d 147, 151 (Kan. 1983).
77 Cooper v. Cavallaro, 481 A.2d 101, 104 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984).
78 Estate of Eisberger v. Nickel, 376 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); see also
Upman v. Clarke, 753 A.2d 4, 9 (Md. 2000) (holding that parent-child relationship “is not
presumed as a matter of law” to be fiduciary relationship); Liapis v. Dist. Ct., 282 P.3d 733,
738 (Nev. 2012) (“Mark and Marie’s mother-son relationship, standing alone, does not
establish a confidential relationship.” (citing, inter alia, Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore,
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fiduciary duties arising from some accident of their relationship with their
children, as in, for example, a parent who receives child support payments
for her child from her ex-spouse.79  But the parent-child relationship is not
an established fiduciary relationship.
Moreover, the reasons we might treat parents as fiduciaries do not
extend to politicians and bureaucrats.  Robert Scott and Elizabeth Scott have
explained that by “re-articulating informal norms in legal prescriptions,” a
fiduciary law of parenthood could “reinforce the independent weight of the
informal precommitments” that usually exist between a parent and a child
but may be weaker in fractured families.80  Reinforcing informal kinship
norms is a far cry from treating public officials as fiduciaries and does not
provide a helpful template for thinking about public fiduciary duties.
C. Public Officials as Trustees
Fiduciary theorists sometimes analogize public officials to private trust-
ees.  A trust exists when a trustee “holds the trust property and is subject to
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of” one or more beneficiaries,
as designated by the settlor who creates the trust and conveys legal title to the
trustee.81  The trust’s separation of risk from control creates agency
problems.  As Robert Sitkoff has argued, the first exists between the settlor
and trustee.82  Dead settlors cannot monitor their trustees.  Nor can living
settlors specify all the trustee’s obligations in advance, at least in a trust of any
complexity.  The second agency problem exists between the trustee and the
beneficiaries.83  The beneficiaries bear the risk of the trustee’s mismanage-
ment, “cannot exit” the trust, and are unlikely to be able to monitor the
trustee effectively.84  That is not to say non-legal monitoring and bonding
mechanisms won’t work in the trust context.  Where, for example, a trustee
and the beneficiary are family, the risks of selfish behavior may be minimal.85
Moreover, many professional trustees are repeat players, recruited by attor-
595 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tex. 1980); Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1985);
Economopoulous v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Va. 2000))).
79 See, e.g., Cumberland v. Cumberland, 564 So. 2d 839, 847 (Miss. 1990); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b(1) (2003); Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 732 (2009).
80 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401,
2449–50 (1995).
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. f (1959).
82 Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
639–40 (2004).
83 Id.
84 Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94
GEO. L.J. 67, 82–83 (2005).
85 See id. at 84 (“[I]f the trustee is an individual, chosen by the settlor for her honesty,
competence and knowledge of family relationships, the beneficiary trusts that the trustee
will continue to act consistently with past behavior.”). But see John H. Langbein, The Con-
tractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 666 (1995) (“Family and personal
trustees often have interests adverse to the trust.”).
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neys who represent settlors and who have reasons to keep the gates secure, so
to speak.86
Imposing fiduciary duties on trustees is a potential solution to these
agency problems.  Under the duty of loyalty, a trustee cannot self-deal or act
on the basis of a conflict of interest.  The no-further-inquiry rule lays down a
firm rule in this regard: upon discerning a conflict of interest, a court will
hold a trustee liable for a breach of fiduciary duty without inquiring into
whether her action benefitted the trust corpus.87  But a simple duty of undi-
vided loyalty is incoherent whenever a trustee serves more than one benefici-
ary.  To address that problem, courts have interpreted the duty of loyalty to
impose a duty of impartiality, requiring the trustee fully to consider and fairly
to balance all the beneficiaries’ interests, consistent with the settlor’s
intent.88  In some cases, these interests may compete.  An income beneficiary
wants the trustee to maximize the trust’s current capacity to produce income,
while a remainder beneficiary wants to maximize the principal.89
The duty of impartiality is intertwined with the trustee’s duty to manage
the trust property prudently.  The Restatement (Third) reflects the generally
accepted definition: “The trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and
manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the
trust.”90  The rule sets a relatively determinate standard.  It refers a court to
prevailing market practices and investment strategies.  Did the trustee rea-
sonably diversify trust investments, in order to minimize the risk to the trust
portfolio?91  Did the trustee seek to preserve the “safety of the principal” and
86 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 937 (2005) (discussing the “strong reputational incentives” for
repeat players). See generally Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 16–21) (on file with Notre Dame
Law Review) (canvassing gatekeeping literature). But see Leslie, supra note 84, at 83–84
(questioning efficacy of trust attorneys as gatekeepers).
87 There are exceptions to this firm rule, “the most important of which is the statutory
authorization, now in nearly all states, for trust companies to participate in the establish-
ment of proprietary mutual funds and to receive compensation for their services to those
funds.”  Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law
at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1911 (2000).
88 In the light of the possibility of conflicts of interest between the settlor and the
beneficiaries, the question whether trustees owe fiduciary duties to both naturally arises.
Even so, the universe of persons to whom duties may be owed remains discernible and
discrete.  For a discussion of the law’s attempts to balance trustee duties towards settlors
and beneficiaries, see Sitkoff, supra note 82, at 657–58 (examining the settlor-benefit
tension).
89 Similar issues can arise in the charitable trust context. See Halbach, supra note 87,
at 1912.
90 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (2007).
91 See, e.g., In re State St. Bank & Trust Co. Fixed Income Funds Inv. Litig., 842 F. Supp.
2d 614, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that fiduciary breached duty by failing to diversify).
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to “assure” a reasonable total return and capital appreciation?92  Did the
trustee seek advice from an investment professional?93  Did the trustee make
reasonable adjustments between principal and income?94  Did she use a total
return strategy under the modern portfolio theory?95  If so, then she likely
discharged her duties of impartiality and of care to the trust beneficiaries.
Thus, trust law defines the fiduciary duties of trustees by reference to a dis-
crete class of beneficiaries, whose interests are discernible and observable
through a well understood maximand rooted in prevailing investment
strategies.
There is no real analogue in public law.  For whom is a congressional
representative a fiduciary?  The voters who elected her?  Everyone who
resides within her district?  We the People?  What about the President—
where do her fiduciary duties lie?  Or federal administrative officials—are
they the agents of the President, as the theory of the unitary executive would
suggest; Congress, an understanding also reflected in administrative law; the
beneficiaries of the regulatory programs they implement; or, yet another pos-
sibility, the people writ large?  In canvassing our constitutional order, for
example, Steven Calabresi has identified four sets of principal-agent relation-
ships, among four principals—“We the People,” the President, congressional
representatives and judges, and congressional committees—and four corre-
sponding agents—“all government officers,” “all executive officers,” “all legis-
lative and judicial personnel and staff,” and “the cabinet departments and
other related entities.”96
A few examples should serve to make the point.  Consider the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency, an executive branch agency.
The President appoints her, and, on the unitary executive theory, is her prin-
cipal.97  That theory is controversial, however.98  Perhaps it is more apt to
look to federal environmental law to identify whether, and to what extent,
the EPA’s head is a fiduciary.  But which law?  The Toxic Substances Control
92 AMY MORISS HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 612 (3d ed.
2012).
93 See, e.g., UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (1994) (“A trustee may delegate invest-
ment and management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could prop-
erly delegate under the circumstances.”).
94 See, e.g., In re Orpheus Trust, 179 P.3d 562, 567 (Nev. 2008) (discussing reasonable
adjustments between interest and principal).
95 See, e.g., UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104 (2000).
96 Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479,
1524 (1994).
97 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
98 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1810–36
(1996) (disputing theory on functionalist grounds); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (disputing theory on
historical grounds).
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Act?99  The Clean Air Act?100  CERCLA?101  The answer seems to be all of the
above.  But that answer is far from a clear one.  Under the CAA, for example,
does the EPA Administrator owe duties to the residents of metropolitan
areas,102 farmers, property owners,103 state and local governments,104 the
public writ large,105 or even the environment itself?  All seem plausible
answers under the statute.  Perhaps it is more cogent, then, to view EPA as
the fiduciary of Congress, which has tasked it with implementing environ-
mental regulation.  If so, then, its fiduciary duties are delimited by statute
and in no need of further elaboration.  But viewing Congress as EPA’s princi-
pal brings us full circle to the controversy regarding the separation of powers
between the legislative and executive branches.  It is easy to say that the EPA
Administrator, like every other public official, is ultimately answerable to the
public.  What that means for public fiduciary law is not easy to discern; after
all, achieving a regulatory benefit invariably means imposing a regulatory
burden.106
What about politicians as fiduciaries?  Consider the President deciding
whether to commit the armed services to an armed conflict.  Suppose he
decides that the armed forces will suffer unimaginable casualties in the
course of the conflict, but that the fight is necessary to protect the nation.
Can we speak of such decisions in fiduciary terms?  In what sense is it sensible
for the President, much less the courts, to think of the office as a fiduciary for
the soon-to-be fallen dead?
Fiduciary theorists might look to the trust analogy to derive a duty of
impartiality for public officials.  But the duty of impartiality in trust law
entails a specific set of obligations to a specific set of beneficiaries.  At some
level, there is likely to be broad agreement that public officials should treat
all citizens fairly.  But that just restates the difficult questions that arise from
our constitutional commitments to equal protection and to due process.
D. Public Officials as Corporate Managers
Another potential analogy runs between public officials and corporate
managers.  Traditionally, courts have imposed fiduciary duties on directors in
both close and public corporations to protect the interests of the corporation
99 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006).
100 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7428 (2006).
101 Id. §§ 9601–9675.
102 Id. § 7401(a)(1) (finding that nation’s metropolitan areas are growing).
103 Id. § 7401(a)(2) (finding that air pollution harms farmers and property owners).
104 Id. § 7401(b)(3) (establishing as purpose of CAA assistance of state and local
governments).
105 Id. § 7401(b)(1) (declaring Congress’s purpose to “promote the public health and
welfare”).
106 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(illustrating importance of transaction costs in determining demand for regulation to
address externalities).
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and shareholders.107  Much of the literature on agency problems concerns
the corporate setting.  In Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’s classic treat-
ment, agency problems arise from the “separation of ownership and control”
in the corporate form.108  This separation creates problems to the extent that
managers control decisionmaking but do not bear the risks of mismanage-
ment, which fall instead on the shareholders.  Due to problems of asymmet-
ric information, observability, and collective action, shareholders often will
not or cannot monitor managers’ decisions.  Management may harm share-
holder interests through incompetence, of course.  Moreover, corporate
managers may pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders.
Jurists and scholars debate which fiduciary duties directors owe, and
whether they owe them to the corporation as an entity or to the sharehold-
ers.109  At the risk of over-simplification, the conventional wisdom is that
directors owe a duty of loyalty that limits self-dealing and self-interested deci-
sionmaking.  The duty of loyalty is not unyielding, however: directors may
defend a self-interested transaction as substantively fair under the “entire fair-
ness” doctrine, or obtain ratification of the transaction from an independent
decisionmaker.110  Directors also owe a duty of care, which requires
informed decisionmaking and some modicum of monitoring of the corpora-
tion’s activities.  Even so, the business judgment rule protects directors from
liability for any number of poor decisions.  This rule sets a “presumption that
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.”111  For a time, Delaware, the lead-
ing corporate law jurisdiction, flirted with an independent duty of good faith,
107 Whether corporate officers have fiduciary duties has been a more vexing question,
which raises problems for the analogy between public officials and corporate managers.
See generally Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at the Officer
Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009) (comparing ubiquity of discussions of fiduciary duties at
director level with absence at officer level).
108 ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 5 (1932); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 38, at 305.  That is not to say, however, that principal-agent theory is the only theory R
of the corporate firm. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989) (discussing modern theories of firm).
109 See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 493
(2012) (discussing debate and citing sources).  There is also an ongoing debate among
jurists and scholars as to whether directors of insolvent corporations owe fiduciary duties to
creditors.  The seminal case supporting such a duty is Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V.
v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).  For
discussions of the debate, see Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s
Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 (2008); Henry T.C. Hu & Jay L. Westbrook, Abolition of the
Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (2007).
110 See, e.g., Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 763–65 (Del. Ch. 1986).
111 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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suggesting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation that shareholders could
hold a director liable for failing to act “in the face of a known duty to act,
[thus] demonstrating a conscious disregard of his duties.”112  But in Stone v.
Ritter the court folded the duty of good faith into the duty of loyalty,113 and
in subsequent cases the court has suggested that nothing short of an
“extreme set of facts” will make out a breach of this aspect of the duty of
loyalty.114
The upshot is that corporate law imposes a limited set of legally enforce-
able obligations that require directors to maximize the value of the corpora-
tion for shareholders.  Absent an apparent conflict of interest, the decisions
of directors are subject to procedural review and shielded by the business
judgment rule.  Many of corporate law’s monitoring and bonding mecha-
nisms—disclosure and reporting requirements, incentive-based compensa-
tion, and the like—have little to do with these fiduciary duties.  Scholars
continue to debate whether these market mechanisms suffice, given that
placing private rights of action in the hands of shareholders promises to
reduce agency problems but comes with the social costs of private enforce-
ment and the risk of over-deterrence.115  Moreover, many scholars criticize
corporate law’s commitment to value maximization, given that shareholders
are not the only corporate constituents and that corporate decisions have
ramifications beyond shareholder value.116  But there is general agreement
that the law, at its base, imposes fiduciary duties on directors in the interests
of a discrete class of beneficiaries, as defined by a well-understood maxi-
mand.  Directors must pursue the “best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders” by maximizing long-term corporate value.117  As Henry
112 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
113 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty . . . encompasses
cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”).
114 Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009).
115 Compare, e.g., FitzGibbon, supra note 28, at 352 (arguing that market mechanisms
cannot achieve benefits of mandatory fiduciary duties), with Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover
Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 144 (1989) (“[The] justifications for
fiduciary duties . . . fail to recognize fully the costs of fiduciary duties compared with other
available alternatives.”).  Some scholars seek a third way beyond the debate between con-
tractarians and altruists. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 (1989).
116 See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib et al., Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships, in THE PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., Oxford Uni-
versity Press, forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Leib et al., Mapping], available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2320548 (discussing shareholder and stakeholder models of corporate
constituencies); see also Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1207, 1217 (2002) (discussing corporate social responsibility movement); Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249
(1999) (arguing for more encompassing “team production approach” to corporate govern-
ance). See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001) (calling
for broader concept of corporate constituencies).
117 Velasco, supra note 23, at 1281 (citation omitted).
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Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman put it, this is the “end of history for corpo-
rate law.”118
Consider, for example, the classic corporate opportunity case Guth v.
Loft, Inc.  The court’s opinion strikes the moralistic tones common to fiduci-
ary law:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound
knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that
demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the
most scrupulous observance of his duty . . . . The rule that requires an undi-
vided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be
no conflict between duty and self-interest.119
Stirring rhetoric, but it hardly decides a case.  In Guth, an officer, who was
also a shareholder, took advantage of a business opportunity that he devel-
oped by exploiting his position with the corporation.  The court gave legal
content to the duty of loyalty by holding that a corporate manager may not
exploit a business opportunity when the corporation “is financially able to
undertake it,” the opportunity is “in the line of the corporation’s business
and is of practical advantage to it,” and, finally, the “corporation has an inter-
est or a reasonable expectancy” in the opportunity.120  This framework dis-
tills a decision rule from the duty of loyalty based upon the goal of
maximizing corporate value.
Interpolating the duty of loyalty into public law cannot work that way.
There is no similar consensus on the ends of administrative or constitutional
law.  Moreover, it is far from clear, in any given case, who the beneficiaries of
public fiduciary duties are.  The most difficult problems in public law do not
correspond to those in Guth and other cases where courts have defined the
metes and bounds of the corporate director’s duty of loyalty.  At its base, the
duty of loyalty “is really only a way to say ‘don’t steal’ from the corpora-
tion,”121 a command that is unhelpful for deciding whether politicians or
bureaucrats have acted consistently with the Constitution or the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) in the mine run of cases.122
118 Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate
law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
119 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939).
120 Id. at 511.
121 Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 249 (2009).
122 In their careful exploration of the promises and pitfalls of the fiduciary analogy,
Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael Serota point out that “[m]ultiple beneficiaries arise
in private law too.” Leib et al., Judging, supra note 4, at 712.  The question, however, is R
whether fiduciary doctrine can help us translate the “public interest” or “regulatory benefi-
ciary interest” that public officials presumably are to maximize under a public fiduciary
model into judicially manageable criteria in public law.  For the reasons discussed in the
text, I doubt it can.  Leib, Ponet, and Serota frankly acknowledge this difficulty and empha-
size how a fiduciary analogy and political remedies (such as impeachment) might shape
judges’ behavior without “direct civil actions” to enforce judges’ fiduciary duties. Id. at
729.
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When it comes to the duty of care, the APA already requires agency offi-
cials to act reasonably based upon the information in the administrative
record.  Does that mean that administrative law is fiduciary in character?  It
would be just as easy to ask, with corporate law scholars, whether the duty of
care “is . . . distinctively fiduciary.”123  In any event, treating administrators
like corporate managers might lead one to dial down, or even to abandon,
the substantive components of arbitrary-and-capricious review.  “Due care” in
the corporate context “is process due care only.”124  Even “stupid,” “egre-
gious,” or “irrational” decisions will suffice if they were based upon a “good
faith effort to advance corporate interests.”125  Limiting breaches of the duty
of care to gross negligence makes some sense given the threat of over-deter-
rence from personal director liability.  Arbitrary-and-capricious review takes
place within a different remedial framework, which undercuts the analogy
between corporate and administrative officials.
E. The Decline of Fiduciary Law?
The analogy to corporate law is interesting in a different respect, how-
ever: scholars have explored whether, and to what extent, fiduciary duties are
in decline in the corporate setting because, first, they are subject to partial
contractual override and, second, courts have narrowed them to “address
very specific and limited misbehavior.”126  Both developments call the theory
of fiduciary government into question.
The contractarian account of fiduciary law is straightforward.  Fiduciary
relationships are one type of contractual relationship.  If contracting parties
could provide rules to govern every potential conflict of interest between
them, then there would be no need for fiduciary law.  But often they can’t.
Courts enforce fiduciary duties where one party hires the expertise of
another, on the “obvious condition” that she not be “at the mercy of an
agent” she cannot monitor.127  The content of those duties should, the argu-
ment runs, maximize the size of the contractual pie, leaving the parties to
divide it as they please.128
The contractarians are correct that much of fiduciary law arises from
agreement.  Some state courts, for example, have suggested informal fiduci-
ary relationships may be limited to contractual relationships.129  Moreover,
many formal fiduciary relationships have contractual features.  Corporate
law, for example, gives the parties freedom to shape the contours of standard
123 DeMott, supra note 51, at 915. R
124 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
125 In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
126 Alces, supra note 121, at 281.
127 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 55, at 426.
128 See id.
129 See, e.g., First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Treasurer Coast v. Pack, 789 So. 2d 411, 414
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Latty v. St. Joseph’s Soc’y of Sacred Heart, Inc., 17 A.3d 155,
162–63 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); Zastrow v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 60
(Wis. 2006).
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corporate arrangements.130  Through the charter or bylaws, for example,
corporations may opt out of default rules regarding the structure and opera-
tion of the board of directors.131  They may also alter the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty.  By statute, for example, Delaware permits the certificate of
incorporation to limit the liability of directors for breaching the duty of
care.132  Corporations can opt out of the duty of loyalty on a retail basis.
Boards may engage in transactions that give rise to a director conflict of inter-
est if they obtain approval from a majority of disinterested directors or share-
holders and a court, reviewing the transaction under the deferential business
judgment rule, concludes it was proper.133  To the extent, moreover, that a
particular jurisdiction imposes mandatory terms of corporate governance, it
is possible to select another jurisdiction in which to incorporate.  Thus, free-
dom of contract plays an important role in corporate law.
It is also possible to make sense of much of trust law—usually thought to
be strictly altruistic—in contractarian terms.  On the one hand, the trust
arrangement does not mirror a standard bilateral contract.  And trust law has
traditionally embraced stringent fiduciary duties.  Under the no-further-
inquiry rule, for example, the trustee is per se liable for self-interested transac-
tions, without regard to damages to the trust property.  On the other hand,
state courts routinely permit trust agreements to exculpate the trustee from
breaches of the duty of care and to limit the duty of loyalty by specifying
actions that do not violate it.134  The Uniform Trust Code develops trust law
in a contractarian direction by, inter alia, permitting exculpatory clauses and
permitting some self-dealing transactions involving the trustee.135
All of which is to suggest that there is a risk of treating fiduciary law as
more altruistic than it currently is, or has been for some time.  Most public
fiduciary theorists offer an altruistic account.  Rave, by contrast, argues that
politicians are fiduciaries even on the contractarian account.  Pointing to
Locke’s social contract, Rave argues there is a tacit agreement between the
people and public officials that supports fiduciary government.136
There are a number of well-known objections to social contract theory,
many of which Evan Fox-Decent presents while elaborating an altruistic
130 See, e.g., Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006)
(“It is settled law that certificates of incorporation are contracts . . . .”).
131 See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60
S.M.U. L. REV. 383, 437–39 (2007) (providing summary in tabular format).
132 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
133 See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 131, at 415 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144
(2010)).
134 See Langbein, supra note 86, at 660.
135 UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b), 801–804 (2010).  Contractarians acknowledge that
there are mandatory trust rules, but argue that “[t]he law of trusts consists overwhelmingly
of default rules that the settlor who creates the trust may alter or negate.”  John H.
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2004).  For
criticism of the contractarian account, see Leslie, supra note 84, at 82–83.
136 Rave, supra note 4, at 712. R
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account of fiduciary government.137  More interesting for our purposes, how-
ever, is an objection that is particularly troublesome for fiduciary govern-
ment.  If the social contract, embodied in the Constitution, is the basis for
imposing fiduciary duties on public officials, then it is worth asking whether
the Constitution derogates from or modifies those duties.  It seems beyond
peradventure that private agreements can at least tailor the duties of loyalty
and of care.  Yet fiduciary theorists have not offered an account of constitu-
tional interpretation that would permit us to determine whether, and to what
extent, the Constitution modifies fiduciary defaults.  Nor have they explained
whether, and to what extent, Congress might have the power to derogate
from fiduciary defaults by statute.138
Rather, one of the more startling features of the commentary on fiduci-
ary government is its insistence upon an altruistic public fiduciary law in the
face of anxiety and uncertainty about the scope of private fiduciary law.  Con-
trast fiduciary government with, for example, Lawrence Mitchell’s elegy upon
the “death of fiduciary duty in close corporations.”139  As Mitchell explains,
the law of close corporations first adopted the aspirational standard of Mein-
hard v. Salmon,140 but its “unyielding principle” soon gave way to a test that
balances a fiduciary’s business interests against the harm to the plaintiff-bene-
ficiary.141  Under this balancing test, a court will not question a fiduciary’s
decision unless there is a showing of an intentional attempt to freeze a minor-
ity shareholder out from corporate decisions, fraud, oppression, or other ille-
gal conduct.  The result is a doctrine that adds little to tort in its restrictions
on majority shareholders.142
Kelli Alces has described a similar retrenchment in the law of public
corporations.  There is no shortage of paeans to fiduciary duties in the cases.
But Delaware law allows for the parties to contract out of the duty of care,
and the business judgment rule protects against poor decisions short of gross
negligence.  Courts have narrowed the duty of loyalty such that “it is a stan-
dard that could be agreed to and enforced contractually.”143  Rather than
137 These objections are: (i) hypothetical consent is not consent; (ii) there is no basis
for inferring tacit consent from a decision not to leave the polity, because exit is not a
realistic option; (iii) voting does not imply consent because we are subject to the state’s
power even if we don’t vote; and (iv) the dead-hand problem vitiates an argument from
consent based upon the written Constitution. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 4, at 117–19. R
138 A social contract account of fiduciary government also has the undesirable conse-
quence of making the already complicated question of non-citizens’ rights more compli-
cated and possibly leading to denial of constitutional protections for non-citizens. See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 927 (1991) (discussing
problem of specifying rights of aliens under social contract theory of government).
139 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1675 (1990).
140 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
141 Mitchell, supra note 139, at 1708.
142 Id. at 1715.
143 Alces, supra note 121, at 249; see Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the
Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 169
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the flexible standard celebrated by altruistic accounts, the corporate duty of
loyalty limits only naked self-dealing and exploitation of corporate
opportunities.144
The reasons for this retrenchment are not hard to discern.  Having rec-
ognized the harshness of Meinhard’s “punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive,”145 courts have limited private fiduciary duties.
F. Public Fiduciaries as a Sui Generis Category
If politicians and bureaucrats are fiduciaries, they are a sui generis cate-
gory.  For all their differences, the private law contexts in which courts have
imposed fiduciary relationships share a few key features: (i) they involve sin-
gle beneficiaries or a discrete class of beneficiaries; (ii) there is rough con-
sensus about the ends of the relationship, with debate focusing upon the
means of achieving those ends; and (iii) the duties of loyalty and care can be
specified in these relationships by reference to a specific maximand and a
discernible set of decision rules.  None of these features obtains when we
treat public officials as fiduciaries.  There is also some amount of healthy
partisanship in a functioning democracy.  Moreover, the Constitution com-
mits us to values that limit judicial authority to enforce public officials’ fiduci-
ary duties.  Unlike their state counterparts, for example, Article III courts
have limited jurisdiction and authority to shape federal law in a common law
mode.146
In careful examinations of the promises and pitfalls of the fiduciary anal-
ogy, Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael Serota have forthrightly described
public fiduciaries as sui generis.147  Morphological similarity between private
and public agency problems is not enough, they argue, to justify treating pub-
lic fiduciaries like private ones.  As a result, the possibilities for translating
private fiduciary law into public law are limited, particularly in light of “how
little headway has been made in delineating fiduciary-beneficiary relation-
ships in the public context.”148
(1997) (calling duty of loyalty “increasingly impotent”); Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of
Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers Have Little to Fear and What Might Be Done
About It, 85 OR. L. REV. 993, 994 (2006) (arguing that “viability” of fiduciary duties “has
been largely erased”).
144 Blair & Stout, supra note 116, at 298–99.
145 Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
146 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011) (“‘There is no
federal general common law,’ Erie  famously recognized.” (citation omitted)).
147 Ethan J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV.
F. 91, 94 (2013) [hereinafter Leib et al., Translating]; cf. Leib et al., Judging, supra note 4, at
712 (“Of course, in understanding public officeholders as fiduciaries, one must consider
the differences between private and public fiduciaries.  Translation is one thing, but trans-
planting an idea from one category to another can lead to category mistakes.”).
148 Leib et al., Mapping, supra note 116, at 12.  In forthcoming work, Leib, Ponet, and
Serota rightly reject “unitary” models of public fiduciaries and seek to start a new “conver-
sation” on specifying the ways in which politicians, bureaucrats, and the institutions they
work within serve as fiduciaries for different beneficiaries with potentially opposing inter-
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With this, the stakes of the debate are clarified.  Given that nothing in
the form of public governance demands fiduciary treatment, and that there
are serious problems with translating from private fiduciary duties to public
ones, what warrant is there for judicial adoption of fiduciary government?
Two possibilities present themselves.  Either legislative intent directs courts to
do so, or a common law of fiduciary government would be desirable for the
polity.  The next two Sections consider these justifications in turn.
III. THE PROBLEM OF INTENT
A. Constitutional Law as Fiduciary Law
As a political theory, fiduciary government resonates with deeply felt
commitments to the rule of law.  It is true that influential political theorists
have described the political duty of a public official in fiduciary terms.  And it
is also true that some of these theorists were among the Founding generation
and deployed political claims of fiduciary government to great rhetorical
effect.
Given this background, the fiduciary account presents a serious alterna-
tive to our contemporary understandings of constitutional law.  Because “the
newly independent Americans frequently used the language of agency and
trusteeship in reference to their legislative representatives,” perhaps we
should interpret constitutional rights in fiduciary terms.149  The Framers’
commitments to popular sovereignty seem consistent with a fiduciary
account that directs politicians, as the people’s agents, to act in the people’s
interests.150
It is far from clear, however, that fiduciary government was a back-
ground understanding of legal rights at the Founding, rather than a way to
think about the political claims that citizens may make upon their representa-
tives.  Indeed, when the Founders raised the theory of fiduciary government,
they often did so in connection with political, not judicial, mechanisms for
holding government accountable.  As a result, there simply is not compelling
enough evidence that the Founders intended to incorporate trust law as con-
stitutional law to justify disturbing settled constitutional understandings.
To unpack the argument, begin with the social compact theory of John
Locke.  The influence of Locke’s philosophy on Anglo-American political
theory, including the theories of the Founders, is well known.  In particular,
his conception of the relationship between the government and the gov-
ests. Id. at 10, 17.  Recognizing that “each context may present sui generis problems,” they
sketch a granular approach by suggesting that corporate law may shed new light on public
fiduciary relationships, and vice versa. Id. at 10, 18.  For my view of the corporate law
analogy, see supra Sections II.D–E.
149 Rave, supra note 4, at 710–11. R
150 See id. at 712 (arguing that constitutional structure imposes duty of loyalty upon
political officials).
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erned in terms of a social compact resonated with a revolutionary generation
making a decisive and unprecedented break with a monarchical past.151
Fiduciary government was part of Locke’s conception of the social com-
pact.  As he put it, “the community put the legislative power into such hands
as they think fit with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws,
or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty as
it was in the state of nature.”152  It is commonplace among fiduciary theorists
to equate Locke’s political conception of the sovereign trust with a legal
one.153  But should the sovereign breach the trust by violating his fiduciary
obligations, Locke explained, the people were empowered to reconstitute
the polity: “[T]he legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain
ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter
the legislative when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed
in them . . . .”154  Thus was the fiduciary obligation of the sovereign enforced
by political action.
The Founders similarly spoke of political duties in terms of a public
trust.  In Federalist 46, for example, Publius opined, “[t]he federal and State
governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people.”155
Similar statements abound, among both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
During the ratification debates, writers appealed to the “public trust” in pop-
ular pamphlets alternatively celebrating and denouncing the proposed Con-
stitution.  For example, Madison, writing as Publius, assured his readers that
constitutional structure would hold congressional representatives to the
“public trust.”156  Brutus was less sanguine: “[T]he representation in the leg-
islature,” he opined, “is not so formed as to give reasonable ground for pub-
lic trust.”157  Thus, both sides drew upon a tradition with which Americans
would have been familiar.  Colonial charters, as well as several state constitu-
tions adopted after the Declaration of Independence, referred to political
office as a public trust.158
The Constitution refers to public office as a public trust several times.
Three of those instances involve little more than the use of “trust” to refer to
public office.159  The fourth is more instructive.  In Article I, Section 3, which
151 See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional
Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 57 (1985) (“It would
be difficult to overstate John Locke’s influence on the American Revolution and the peo-
ple who created the government that followed it.”).
152 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 190 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947)
(emphasis added).
153 See, e.g., Rave, supra note 4, at 708–09. R
154 LOCKE, supra note 152, at 196.
155 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
156 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 345 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
157 See Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1145 (quoting Brutus).
158 See id. at 1111–14.
159 Article I, Section 9 prohibits a person holding a “Trust” under the United States
from accepting an office from a foreign power “without the Consent of Congress.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9.  Article II, Section 1 prohibits any “Person holding an Office of Trust . . .
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provides for impeachment of “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States,”160 the Constitution specifies that “Judgment in
Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office,
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States.”161  Impeachment, of course, is a political remedy
for a public wrong.  As Publius put it: “The subjects of [the] jurisdiction” of a
“well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments . . . . are of a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated [political], as they relate
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.”162  The concept of
political injuries to society itself, as opposed to justiciable injuries to private
rights, was a familiar one from the common law.  The common law forms of
action generally did not provide private rights to sue to right political
wrongs.163  In keeping with this understanding of the judicial role, the Fram-
ers chose a political body to try impeachments.164
It is thus telling that the Framers consistently described breaches of the
public trust as offenses that would subject an official to impeachment.  Again,
Publius: “[O]ffenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or,
in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust . . . . are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated [politi-
cal] . . . .”165  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, speaking at the South Carolina
ratifying convention, said that impeachment is the proper remedy for “those
under the United States” from being appointed to the Electoral College. Id. art. II, § 1.
And Article VI protects freedom of conscience by providing “no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” Id. art.
VI.
160 Id. art. II, § 4.
161 Id. art. II, § 3.
162 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON,
L.L.D. 166 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804) (“In the United States and in Pennsylvania, impeach-
ments are confined to political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to
political punishments.”).
163 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387,
404–07 (1995).
164 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 162, at 397 (“If this be the design of it, who
can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation them-
selves?”).  Nor did the Framers see impeachment as impacting private rights.  Rather, the
majority rejected the notion that impeachment was subject to the constitutional rules gov-
erning the criminal process. See Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal Impeachment and Criminal
Procedure: The Framers’ Intent, 52 MD. L. REV. 437, 456–57 (1993).  That is not to say the
adjudicatory nature of an impeachment proceeding was lost on the Framers.  In its address
to the state convention, for example, the Pennsylvania minority argued that to lodge the
power to try impeachments in the Senate was to mix judicial and legislative powers in
violation of the separation of powers. See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of
the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 251 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003).
165 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 162, at 396.
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who behave amiss, or betray their public trust.”166  James Madison at the
Convention stated that because the President “might betray his trust to for-
eign powers,” among other wrongs, impeachment was a constitutional neces-
sity.167  And Gouverneur Morris, who found Madison’s argument convincing,
stated that the President “may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his
trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger
of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst
it by displacing him.”168  Joseph Story, heir to this understanding, described
impeachable offenses as including “what are aptly termed, political offences,
 . . . . various in their character, and so indefinable in their actual involutions,
that it is almost impossible to provide systematically for them by positive
law.”169  Story, like the Framers, was echoing Blackstone, whose Commentaries
listed “mal-administration of . . . high officers, as are in public trust and
employment” as the “first and principal” impeachable offense “towards the
king and government.”170  A breach of the public trust was, in short, an
impeachable political offense.
Thus, the link between fiduciary theory and political remedies was
explicit in the Founders’ thinking.  Natelson, who has offered a robust inter-
pretivist defense of fiduciary government, acknowledges the point.
“Impeachment,” he notes, “was the principal punitive measure associated in
the public mind with [an official’s] breach of trust.”171  That description sug-
gests, however, that a breach of the public trust was a political wrong “to the
society itself”—just the sort of public wrong that a private plaintiff could not
litigate in court.  As Michael Gerhardt has explained, following the English
understanding, the Framers viewed “impeachable offenses [as] political
crimes . . . . against the state.”172
One objection is that only executive officials and judges, not members of
Congress, are “civil Officers”173 subject to impeachment under Article II.
The failed impeachment of Senator William Blount is often taken as conclu-
sively establishing that members of Congress are not subject to the Senate’s
impeachment jurisdiction, although that reads the evidence for more than it
166 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 281 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891).
167 See Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1165 (quoting James Madison, Journal
(July 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66
(Max Farrand ed., 1937)).
168 See id. at 1166 (quoting James Madison, Journal (Jul. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 167, at 70).
169 JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 234
(1833); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 105 (2d ed.
2000) (describing how delegates to state ratifying conventions identified impeachable
offenses as deviations from duty and abuse of power).
170 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 121–22 (1765–69).
171 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1165.
172 GERHARDT, supra note 169, at 103–04 (emphasis added).
173 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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is worth.174  But the conventional wisdom does not require a contrary read-
ing of the Founders’ understanding of the public trust.  At the Convention,
Madison assured his colleagues that, unlike in the case of the President, “[i]t
could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an
Assembly would either lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to
betray, their trust.”175  Thus, impeachment was not a necessary remedy for a
legislator’s breach of trust.  Moreover, each house can expel its members for
“disorderly Behaviour,”176 and there is reason to think impeachable
offenses—including, of course, breach of the public trust—would be suffi-
cient grounds for expulsion.177  Admittedly, expulsion has rarely occurred in
American history,178 but elections have, and the ballot box provides an addi-
tional remedy for a legislator’s derogation of political duties.
So far we have considered an official’s breach of the public trust.  What
of institutional breaches of the trust?  As far as I am aware, the Founders
tended to speak of officials, rather than the branches as institutions, as poten-
tially breaching the public trust.  That may go a long way toward explaining
why Madison was more concerned with presidential rather than congres-
sional breaches of the trust.  Put simply, even if individual members could
breach the public trust, that did not necessarily mean that Congress as a body
could.179  On that understanding, violations of the public trust could not be
the basis for a private right against congressional action.180
It is important not to press the distinction between institutions and indi-
vidual officials too far, though.  Corporate boards of directors may be fiducia-
ries, after all.181  Yet the corporate analogy may be instructive in another
174 David P. Currie, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 427, 428 (1998) (reviewing BUCKNER F. MEL-
TON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR
WILLIAM BLOUNT (1998)).
175 James Madison, Journal (July 20, 1787), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 15
(Galliard Hunt ed., 1903).
176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
177 See GERHARDT, supra note 169, at 76 (“[T]he expulsion power given to Congress
most logically qualifies as Congress’s analogue to impeachment for the purposes of disci-
plining its members.”); Timothy Zick, The Consent of the Governed: Recall of United States Sena-
tors, 103 DICK. L. REV. 567, 569–70 (1999) (noting that recall by the states was yet another
potential remedy for senators).
178 See Zick, supra note 177, at 594.
179 In Federalist 55, for example, Publius wrote of congressmen:
I am . . . unable to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short
time, in the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of recom-
mending themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would either desire
or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed
to them.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 156, at 344 .
180 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1209, 1210 (2010) (“Every constitutional inquiry should begin with a basic question that
has been almost universally overlooked.  The fundamental question, from which all else
follows, is the who question: who has violated the Constitution?”).
181 Leib et al., Mapping, supra note 116, at 16.
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respect.  To the extent that the Founders thought of judicial review of legisla-
tive action in private law terms, there is strong evidence they would have
looked to the corporate law doctrine of repugnancy rather than to private
fiduciaries’ duties of loyalty and care.  Mary Sarah Bilder has traced the ori-
gins of judicial review to “a longstanding English corporate practice under
which a corporation’s ordinances were reviewed for repugnancy to the laws
of England.”182  The Founders were familiar with this doctrine as a constraint
on their colonial governments, which, as chartered English corporations
could not legislate contrary to English law.  Bilder amasses a trove of evi-
dence suggesting that “ ‘the Constitution’ replaced the ‘laws of England’” fol-
lowing the Revolution.183  Importantly, Marbury v. Madison accords with
Bilder’s account.  In justifying judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall echoed
the repugnancy doctrine of corporate law.  “[T]he constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it,” he held, and, therefore, a law “repugnant to
the constitution[ ] is void.”184  Though Marbury once describes the justice of
the peace as an “office[ ] of trust,”185 it gives no hint that the content of con-
stitutional law lies in the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
More importantly, McCulloch v. Maryland’s186 longstanding gloss on the
Necessary and Proper Clause makes no explicit mention of trust law, and
describes the constraints it imposes in forgiving terms.187  Natelson, however,
argues that the trust origins of the Clause are implicit in its text.  The argu-
ment begins by canvassing incidental powers clauses in eighteenth-century
legal documents that created agency relationships.188  Some of these docu-
ments included the phrase “necessary and proper,” and others used similar
wording, to convey that an agent had implied powers necessary to make the
grant of authority effective.189  More particularly, Natelson argues, the word
“proper” connoted the fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, and impartial-
ity.190  So too, he argues, the Necessary and Proper Clause connotes not only
incidental powers—the focus of McCulloch’s gloss—but also fiduciary con-
straints on Congress.191
Natelson marshals strong evidence that the Framers had a stock of pri-
vate law examples upon which to base constitutional constraints, but he is on
182 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 504
(2006).
183 Id.
184 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
185 Id. at 164.
186 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
187 Because the strongest evidence of incorporation concerns the Necessary and Proper
Clause, it is appropriate to focus upon it when considering the interpretive case for consti-
tutional law as a branch of fiduciary law.
188 See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY
LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 68–70 (2010).
189 Id. at 56–67.
190 Id. at 79.
191 See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
LAWSON ET AL., supra note 188, at 119.
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shakier ground in suggesting that incorporation of such a clause in the Con-
stitution carried with it eighteenth-century fiduciary constraints on agents.
As other scholars have shown, incidental powers clauses appeared in other
types of legal documents during the time, including corporate charters, and
the concept also appeared in the common law of administrative review in
England.192  Why then conclude that the Constitution’s incidental powers
clause incorporated trust law, rather than corporate or administrative com-
mon law?193  Absent a showing that “necessary and proper” was a term of art
that necessarily entailed judicial review under a fiduciary model—which
Natelson concedes the evidence does not support—the argument for incor-
poration falters.194  Recalling Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition in McCul-
loch seems unavoidable: “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding,” not a trust document.195
As a constitution, the meaning of our founding document has been “liq-
uidated” over time in ways that are inconsistent with the fiduciary account.196
Take, for example, Carolene Products footnote four,197 which John Hart Ely
expounded upon in elaborating his influential representation-reinforcing
account of judicial review.198  The outlines of this approach are familiar: gov-
ernment action that clogs the political process, or burdens discrete and insu-
lar minorities, is subject to greater judicial scrutiny.199  Judicial protection of
traditionally disenfranchised minorities is warranted on the theory that it is
necessary to ensure that their interests, which politicians are apt to ignore,
will be represented in the polity.  The logic of footnote four is that judges
should be especially partial to some interest groups.  For example, it does not
direct searching review towards special interest legislation that burdens the
economic interests of one well-heeled group at the expense of another.
Thus, the logic of footnote four sits uneasily within the fiduciary framework,
which is why it is unsurprising that Natelson has suggested abandoning it in
favor of an approach that lessens scrutiny of legislation burdening discrete
and insular minorities and ratchets up scrutiny of social and economic
legislation.200
As an account of Founding-era political theory, fiduciary government
has purchase.  As an account of judicially enforceable constitutional rights,
192 See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, in LAWSON
ET AL., supra note 188, at 121–35, 150–54.
193 John Manning offers a similar critique in John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper
Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1353, 1369–74 (2012) (reviewing
LAWSON ET AL., supra note 188).
194 See id.
195 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
196 Manning, supra note 193, at 1375 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, 229–30 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
197 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
198 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
199 See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
200 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1177–78.
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however, it is unconvincing.  The Constitution’s text does not state, or even
strongly suggest, that constitutional law is a branch of the law of trusts, leav-
ing fiduciary theorists to argue from evidence of historical intent that is at
best ambiguous and, importantly, hard to square with precedent.  That leaves
the case for fiduciary government to turn upon the practical consequences of
retooling constitutional law to fit the fiduciary model, as Part IV discusses.201
B. The Fiduciary Account of Administrative Law
What of a fiduciary theory of federal administrative law?  The sine qua
non of a fiduciary relationship is that the fiduciary must act solely in the inter-
ests of her beneficiary.  But neither the APA nor administrative common law
encourages agencies singularly to focus upon the interests of the benefi-
ciaries of a regulatory program.  Consider, for instance, arbitrary-and-capri-
cious review of agency action.  The cases are legion in which federal courts
have vacated agency action not for a failure loyally to pursue regulatory bene-
ficiaries’ interests, but rather for doing so at the expense of competing and
incommensurate values they should have considered but did not.202
201 It is worth contrasting the rights-based approach of fiduciary government with
Zephyr Teachout’s structuralist account of the anti-corruption principle in constitutional
law.  As Teachout shows, many of the Framers’ institutional design choices responded to a
concern about political corruption, broadly defined.  She argues that the Constitution
embodies an anti-corruption principle no less important than other structural commit-
ments, such as the separation of powers and federalism.  As her careful assessment shows,
the Framers instantiated this principle through specific design choices about the three
branches of the national government, ranging from Article I, Section 2’s design for the
frequency of elections to Article III, Section 2’s requirement of jury trials.  Teachout, supra
note 19, at 355.  In interpreting those structural provisions, a court might be guided by the
anti-corruption principle.  More broadly, Teachout argues that the anti-corruption princi-
ple supports election reforms designed to address political corruption, helping shield
them from challenge under rights provisions of the Constitution, such as the First Amend-
ment. See id. at 343, 345 (arguing that an anti-corruption principle gives “Con-
gress . . . leeway to pursue [election law reforms] absent very strong countervailing
constitutional limitations”).  Teachout’s call for consideration of a freestanding anti-cor-
ruption principle in deferring to legislative attempts to curtail political corruption is a far
cry from treating constitutional rights like the rights that beneficiaries enjoy against private
fiduciaries. Compare, e.g., id. at 410 (arguing that, like separation of powers, “anti-corrup-
tion principle . . . is . . . worthy of weighing directly against other freestanding principles”),
with Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 4, at 55 (arguing for judicial enforcement of
“[t]he General Welfare Clause . . . as a trust-style rule denying Congress authority to levy
taxes for any but general, national purposes”).
202 See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881–82 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  Fiduciary theorists
might address this problem by treating the public writ large, or some subset of affected or
potentially aggrieved parties, as the beneficiaries of all agency action.  But there are two
problems with this approach.  First, as Criddle argues, many regulatory programs are
designed to benefit some interests and not others, and it is a “mistake” to treat the general
public as the beneficiary for fiduciary analysis.  Criddle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 138.
Second, treating the public as the beneficiary for purposes of fiduciary analysis makes the
formal and conceptual problems with the analogy particularly acute. See supra Part II.
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Indeed, many doctrines in federal administrative law favor regulated par-
ties rather than regulatory beneficiaries.  Thus, administrative law enables
regulated parties to influence agency action in ways and to a degree that
fiduciary theory cannot explain.  In particular, by permitting agencies to crys-
tallize policy before issuing notices of proposed rulemaking, allowing them
to use guidance documents to set enforcement priorities, limiting review of
agency inaction, and denying standing to regulatory beneficiaries for lack of
an “injury-in-fact,” federal administrative law seems designed in part to dis-
empower regulatory beneficiaries.203  Moreover, the Court’s balancing
approach to procedural due process—which limits regulatory beneficiaries’
rights based upon the costs to the agency of additional procedures204—is
difficult to explain in fiduciary terms.
Fiduciary government does not find support in the “political origins” of
the grand charter of federal administration, the APA.205  To be fair, fiduciary
theorists do not base their normative claims about judicial review of federal
administrative action on the New Deal Congress’s intent in enacting the APA.
Instead, they look to administrative common law.  But fiduciary theory does
not provide a compelling account of the superstructure of administrative
common law that courts have built upon the base of the APA.
The APA was “a hard-fought compromise” between Democrats who
wanted to entrench New Deal policies against future agency change and
aggressive judicial review and Republicans, joined by Southern Democratic
allies, who hoped to permit agency policy to drift with a change in the politi-
cal winds.206  There is no evidence either party intended to authorize robust
judicial review of agency action based upon a fiduciary model.  The terms of
the debate were rather different.  New Deal Democrats “favored a form of
government in which expert bureaucrats would influence even the details of
the economy, with little recourse for the people and businesses that felt the
impacts of the bureaucrats’ commands.”207  Their conservative opponents
203 See Richard Murphy, Enhancing the Role of Public Interest Organizations in Rulemaking
Via Pre-Notice Transparency, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 683 (2012) (discussing how
rulemaking procedures “may often disfavor” beneficiaries); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and
the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1459 (1988) (noting the Court’s
“hostility” to beneficiary suits in nonreviewability doctrine); Wendy E. Wagner, Administra-
tive Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010) (“[L]ess well-
financed interest groups find it hard to continue participating in the process.”).
204 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (creating balancing test for
due process claims).
205 The phrase is Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast’s. See
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180,
181 (1999).
206 For an encyclopedic account of the legislative origins of the APA, see George B.
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560–61 (1996); see also Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure
Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219, 219 (1986); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1986); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present,
Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 447 (1986).
207 Shepherd, supra note 206, at 1559.
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were not concerned with protecting regulatory beneficiaries; instead, they
aimed to protect the property rights of regulated parties through “rule of
law” constraints on agency action.208
Both parties scored partial victories.  Conservatives could be satisfied
that when private rights were at stake in adjudicatory proceedings, the APA
imposed procedural due process protections.  New Deal Democrats could
look to the text’s comparatively lax demands for legislative rulemaking, as
well as its commitment of legal questions to the federal judiciary, then staffed
with New Deal appointees.
The fiduciary model is at odds with some of the New Deal Congress’s
specific compromises.  Consider, for example, the argument, grounded in
fiduciary theory, that all agency rulemaking should be subject to “full notice-
and-comment procedural requirements.”209  With the APA, Congress
exempted interpretive and procedural rules from those requirements.210
That exemption is legible in light of congressional concerns over agency flex-
ibility.  Under the Vermont Yankee doctrine, federal courts have no warrant to
layer notice-and-comment procedures on top of interpretive and procedural
rulemaking.211  As a result, implementing a fiduciary model would require
political action.  To embrace fiduciary theory, in short, would be to deny the
political compromise reached in the APA.
The retort is that courts have already departed from interpreting the
APA.  Consider, for instance, the Chevron doctrine, which seems flatly incon-
sistent with the APA’s instruction in § 706 that courts will determine ques-
tions of law when reviewing agency action.212  There is much to be said for
this reply.  Fiduciary theory may ultimately rise and fall on pragmatic rather
than interpretive considerations.
Still, Chevron cannot be reconciled with a fiduciary theory of administra-
tive law.  Under Chevron, when Congress has spoken clearly, an agency, like a
court, must follow its direction.  But when Congress has left a question in an
agency-administered statute open, the agency may adopt any reasonable stat-
utory interpretation into law.  The Chevron Court justified deference to an
agency’s statutory interpretations as follows:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government.  Courts must, in some cases, reconcile compet-
ing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy
preferences.  In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated poli-
cymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
208 Id.
209 Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 480.
210 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012).
211 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549
(1978) (“The court should . . . not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the proce-
dural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are
‘best.’”).
212 See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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judgments.  While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices . . . .213
Thus, one justification for Chevron deference concerns agencies’ comparative
expertise in regulatory policy, and the other involves their greater political
accountability through the President.  The emphasis throughout the opinion
is on the competitive nature of the political process, in which warring coali-
tions in Congress may “take their chances with the scheme devised by the
agency,” which is then tasked with “resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest” based upon the “incumbent administration’s
views of wise policy.”214
Criddle has offered the most complete argument that Chevron is consis-
tent with fiduciary theory.  The centerpiece of his argument is United States v.
Mead Corp., which presumes that Congress intends to delegate statutory ques-
tions to an agency when a statute is ambiguous, Congress has tasked the
agency with administering the statute, and the agency has adopted the inter-
pretation in a rulemaking or adjudication that carries the force of law.215
Under Mead, legislative intent to delegate remains a “thinly veiled fiction,”
but, Criddle argues, “it is no greater fiction than private fiduciary law’s attri-
bution of entrusted authority to parents, guardians, and other noncontrac-
tual fiduciaries.”216  But the analogy does not hold.  Nothing in Mead
suggests a fiction based upon fiduciary government.  Moreover, nothing in
Chevron suggests that it would be desirable or proper for federal courts to
hold agencies to freestanding “duties of fidelity”217—instead, Chevron shifted
authority away from the Article III judiciary and towards the “incumbent
administration[ ]” and its “views of wise policy.”218
Absent grounding in the text of the Constitution or a statute, fiduciary
government’s legitimacy rises or falls upon the functional grounds we use to
judge any federal common law.  For those who take a narrow view of judicial
competence, the absence of a specific authorization for fiduciary government
will be fatal to the theory.  I do not take that tack.  Rather, in Part IV I con-
sider whether fiduciary government is desirable and conclude it is not.
213 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
214 Id. at 865–66.
215 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
216 Criddle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 146–47.
217 Id. at 139, 146–47.
218 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, Presidential
Control Is Better Than the Alternatives, 88 TEX. L. REV. 113, 116 (2009) (“Criddle . . . is actually
urging adoption of a legal regime that would prefer judges to either the President or
agency heads as the primary determinants of agency policy decisions.  Of course, that is
exactly the opposite of the holding and reasoning of the Supreme Court in Chevron.”); cf.
Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1444 (2013) (arguing Criddle “cannot explain why agencies are pref-
erable to political actors—particularly the President—for resolving fundamental issues of
values that are embedded in rulemaking decisions”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 38 17-FEB-14 14:19
1182 notre dame law review [vol. 89:3
IV. THE PROBLEM OF FUNCTION
To assess fiduciary government, it makes sense to consider the areas
where federal lawmakers have experimented with it.  In a few cases, they have
imposed relatively narrow constraints on political corruption and naked self-
dealing.  These cases provide little heft for fiduciary government, not only
because of their limited scope, but also because they suggest problems with
the theory in practice.  These problems become acute where federal courts
experiment with broader fiduciary constraints.
A. Narrow Public Fiduciary Constraints
1. Political Corruption and the Honest Services Statute
Curiously, fiduciary theorists do not make anything out of the one con-
text where federal courts frequently describe government in fiduciary terms:
criminal prosecutions of state and local officials under the federal honest
services statute.  Federal criminal law prohibits wire and mail fraud, includ-
ing fraudulent deprivations of the “intangible right of honest services.”219
Federal courts have held that “[e]lected officials generally owe a fiduciary
duty to the electorate,” and that, when they breach that duty and deprive
citizens of something of economic value, officials may be criminally liable
under the honest services statute.220
Many honest services prosecutions have involved naked self-dealing.
Although there are reasons to object to federal policing of state and local
government on federalism grounds, a narrow criminal constraint on self-
dealing seems largely unobjectionable.  Only the Department of Justice
(DOJ) can prosecute honest services fraud, which limits the risk of over-
deterrence that would arise from broad private enforcement of public fiduci-
ary duties.  And given the widespread norm against quid pro quo corrup-
tion,221 prosecution does not impose fiduciary constraints in the absence of
consensus about the ends of regulation.
Criminal prohibition of political corruption need not depend upon a
fiduciary model of political ethics, however.  One may object to corruption
on equality grounds: it allows some citizens unequal access to political deci-
sionmakers.  Another objection is that it effectively suppresses the speech of
some by elevating the speech of others.  Yet a third objection is that it leads to
inefficient governance and has market-distorting effects.  A fourth focuses
upon the expressive impact of political corruption: “Leave the perception of
impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call
the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.”222  None of these objections focuses upon an official’s breach
219 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
220 United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997).
221 See William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement, 51
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 360, 369 (2013).
222 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000).
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of a duty of loyalty, but rather upon the harms that may arise from a corrupt
political system.223
Had the DOJ confined itself to prosecuting state and local officials for
naked self-dealing, the honest services statute might have remained a rela-
tively uncontroversial mechanism for addressing those potential harms.  But
in the 1970s, the DOJ sought to broaden the scope of the statute to include
“abstract” breaches of a politician’s duty towards her constituents, without
regard to an injury to money or property.224 United States v. Mandel is illustra-
tive.  In that case, the Fourth Circuit held that the Governor of Maryland
could be liable for honest services fraud when he promoted the enactment of
legislation that redounded to the benefit of his friends in the race track
industry, even though the government had not shown that he had any “direct
interest” in the race track business, much less that his friends had offered
him a bribe.225
Mandel and similar cases launched a firestorm of criticism.  It was far
from clear, commentators pointed out, that the honest services statute
authorized an expansive federal common law of political crimes.  The Mandel
approach threatened to expand prosecutorial discretion beyond acceptable
bounds and to turn tortious activity into federal crimes.  John Coffee offered
a trenchant statement of the critical view:
To describe political patronage as in conflict with the common morality, and
hence “a scheme to defraud” citizens of their tangible right to honest gov-
ernment, seems inconsistent with the undeniable existence of that institu-
tion as a recognized and highly visible part of American political life at least
since the time of Andrew Jackson.226
Perhaps judicial retrenchment was inevitable.  In Skilling v. United States,
the Court construed the honest services statute narrowly to avoid constitu-
tional concerns under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.227  Under Skilling, the
statute proscribes bribes and kickbacks, nothing more.228  Thus ended the
DOJ’s experiment with a broad doctrine of public fiduciary duties for state
and local officials.  To be sure, the Court’s reasoning was unique to the crimi-
nal context.  No void-for-vagueness doctrine compels judicial reluctance to
recognize private rights of action to enforce public fiduciary duties.  But
many of the objections to broad honest services prosecutions are cogent in
223 For further discussion of these theories of political corruption, see Teachout, supra
note 19, at 342.  Of course, the existence of multiple theories of the prohibition on politi-
cal self-dealing does not itself count against fiduciary government.  My point is simply that
there may be alternative accounts of political corruption that do not present the same
problems of fit, intent, and function as fiduciary government.
224 W. Robert Gray, Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prose-
cutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 562, 563 (1980).
225 591 F.2d 1347, 1359–60, 1364 (4th Cir. 1979).
226 John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduci-
ary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 144
(1981).
227 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32 (2010).
228 Id.
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the civil setting.  Fiduciary government may unduly interject judicial over-
sight into the workings of government.  Whether the federal courts have a
warrant to interject themselves in this way is at least debatable in some cases,
particularly where the textual or doctrinal hook is vague at best.
2. Insider Trading and the STOCK Act
Where Congress has mandated public fiduciary duties, this last objection
does not arise.  Some ethics-in-government provisions can be understood in
fiduciary terms but impose constraints that are narrow and thus not a model
for the broad fiduciary theory of government.  Consider, for example, the
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act).229
The Act requires members of Congress, their staffs, and executive branch
employees to disclose their financial information in order to deter them
from trading in securities based upon nonpublic information they obtained
in their capacity as public servants.230  The Act also clarifies that the securi-
ties laws’ prohibition upon insider trading applies to public officials.231
Thus, the STOCK Act imposes a limited prohibition founded in a fiduciary
duty of trust and confidentiality.
In its short life the STOCK Act has had a mixed record.  Congress thrice
postponed the reporting requirements, and critics have argued the Act could
undermine national security and the privacy of federal employees.232  A fed-
eral district court temporarily enjoined implementation of the Act on the
ground that the Act unduly burdens the substantive due process right to pri-
vacy.233  Moreover, the insider trading prohibitions turn upon the misuse of
“material” information, and defining materiality in the public setting will
prove difficult at best.
Whatever the STOCK Act’s merits, the problems with its implementation
suggest the potential pathologies of a broad doctrine of fiduciary govern-
ment.  Imposing fiduciary duties upon a bureaucracy as far reaching as the
national government raises a bevy of competing concerns that do not arise in
the traditional fiduciary case.  The STOCK Act, for example, threatens daily
political interactions with the specter of insider trading liability, which
includes trading upon “tips” from covered persons.234  That is not to say the
STOCK Act is bad policy, although it is terribly in need of clarification.  It is
229 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-105, 126 Stat.
291.
230 Id. § 6.
231 Id. § 4(a).
232 See Kellie Lunney, Congress Again Delays STOCK Act for Senior Execs, GOV’T EXEC.
(Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2012/12/congress-again-delays-
stock-act-senior-execs/60006/.
233 See Senior Execs. Ass’n v. United States, 891 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (D. Md. 2012).
234 See, e.g., Brad S. Karp, Unintended Consequences of the STOCK Act, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 14, 2012, 9:35 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2012/03/14/unintended-consequences-of-the-stock-act/.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 41 17-FEB-14 14:19
2014] the  false  promise  of  f iduciary  government 1185
to say, however, that even narrow fiduciary constraints on government may
cause significant functional problems.
B. Broad Fiduciary Government
In some cases, courts have experimented with broad fiduciary rules for
government, usually with questionable, sometimes with disastrous, results.
1. The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine
Perhaps the best example is the federal Indian trust doctrine.  The foun-
dation of the doctrine lies in the Founding period.  The Constitution recog-
nizes Indian tribes as preconstitutional sovereigns.235  The federal trust
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes is “traceable” to a
bilateral relationship stretching back “to the first cessions of Indian land to
the federal government.”236  When the United States, by virtue of the doc-
trine of discovery and treaties with Indian tribes, obtained title to tribal lands,
it accepted the duty of treating the tribes with the faithfulness of a fiduciary.
In the Marshall trilogy of cases, Chief Justice John Marshall grounded the
trust relationship in international law and the “doctrine of discovery” that
legitimated European claims to Indian lands based upon conquest or agree-
ment with tribes.237  Marshall drew an analogy to the relationship between a
“ward” and a “guardian,” while suggesting the federal-tribal relationship was
a unique one that required the national government to protect tribal
sovereignty.238
The trust relationship imposes upon the United States a proprietary
trust responsibility in so far as it manages Indian property for tribes or indi-
vidual Indians.  In form, this proprietary trust mirrors private trusts in which
a trustee manages property for the benefit of another.  It does not depend
upon the United States’ status as a sovereign, and its contours “are largely
defined in traditional equitable terms.”239
That is the conventional understanding anyway.  In recent years, how-
ever, the Court has shown little patience for even the narrow proprietary
trust.  Its recent decision in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation240 portends
reluctance to treat the United States as a conventional fiduciary.  The Jicarilla
Court held that because the United States government is tasked with repre-
senting many competing public interests, the fiduciary exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege does not apply when tribes request documents pertaining
to the Department of Interior’s alleged mismanagement of Indian trust
235 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
236 Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495–96.
237 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591–92 (1823).
238 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
239 Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
240 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2326 (2011).
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funds.241  In treating a proprietary trust relationship as something other than
a conventional trust, the Court rejected fiduciary constraints on government
even when the analogy was most apt.
There are a few additional features of the Indian trust doctrine that
should give one pause when considering the promise of a broader doctrine
of fiduciary government.  For one, when expanded beyond the classic propri-
etary trust, the Indian trust doctrine has proved, according to various schol-
ars, “ ‘elusive and confusing,’ ‘vexing’ and ‘vague,’ ‘unsatisfactorily
amorphous’ and ‘unclear,’ ‘schizophrenic,’ ‘ill-defined,’ a ‘double-edged
sword,’” and the like.242  Nor has the Indian trust proven an effective moral
constraint on the federal government.  While the Court has described the
Indian trust in moral terms that recall Meinhard’s famous rhetoric,243 “the
government, more often than not, has failed to keep its pledges to its Indian
beneficiaries.”244
Indeed, courts have often treated the trust relationship as a shield for
government action, not a sword to challenge it.  As Reid Chambers has writ-
ten, “while courts recognize that Congress has a trust responsibility, they uni-
formly regard it as essentially a moral obligation, without justiciable
standards for its enforcement.”245  In a series of late nineteenth-century
cases, most notoriously in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,246 the Court linked the trust
relationship with a “plenary” power doctrine giving Congress unilateral
authority to disregard the United States’ treaty responsibilities.247  Nell Jes-
sup Newton has summarized the depth and breadth of Congress’s “plenary”
power to abrogate or to alter Indian rights:
The [C]ourt has upheld congressional power to reduce the boundaries of a
reservation without tribal consent or compensation, thereby reducing, for all
practical purposes, a tribe’s power to govern.  In addition the Court has
241 See id. (“[T]he Government seeks legal advice in its sovereign capacity rather than
as a conventional fiduciary of the Tribe.”).
242 Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and the Federal
Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 307 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
243 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (stating that the federal
government, in its relationships with Indian tribes, “has charged itself with moral obliga-
tions of the highest responsibility and trust”).
244 Eugenia Allison Phipps, Note, Feds 200, Indians 0: The Burden of Proof in the Federal/
Indian Fiduciary Relationship, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1637, 1640 (2000).
245 Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1227 (1975).
246 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
247 In Lone Wolf the Court gave a judicial stamp of approval to Congress’s action to
force the allotment of Indian lands in violation of treaties between the United States and
several tribes.  Emphasizing notions of racial superiority, the Court held that there are no
constitutional constraints on Congress’s control over Indian affairs. See id. at 567.  The
decision has been roundly criticized as one of the Court’s “worst.” See, e.g., Joseph William
Singer, Lone Wolf, Or How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere Change in the Form of Invest-
ment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 37 (2002).  The Court will not, however, let Lone Wolf disap-
pear. See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324 (2011) (quoting
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565).
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upheld power to divest a tribe of all criminal, civil, or regulatory jurisdiction;
to abrogate treaties; and to subject tribal laws and constitutions to federal
approval.  As to tribal property rights, . . . . Congress may abrogate without
liability future interests in Indian lands granted by earlier statutes, and may
enlarge or decrease the class of beneficiaries of tribal trust funds or lands.
Congress may take one kind of tribal property, aboriginal Indian property,
without paying compensation; it may, without consent, dispose of recog-
nized-title tribal property under the guise of management and sell it at less
than fair market value without liability, as long as the tribe receives some
proceeds.248
A fiduciary relationship indeed.
The plenary power doctrine speaks to the dubious associations between
fiduciary government and colonial and imperial self-justification.  The charge
of paternalism is potentially an embarrassment to fiduciary theory, particu-
larly when one considers how it was deployed by European powers to justify
colonial and imperial expansion.  According to colonial theory, European
powers had not only a warrant but also a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of
non-European peoples who, as history would have it, were especially vulnera-
ble to European guns and European diseases.  Fiduciary theorists respond to
this potential embarrassment by distinguishing that use of fiduciary govern-
ment as rhetorical and racist.  But postcolonial scholarship has charted the
ways in which the fiduciary idea was productive of a racist colonial project and
not simply reflective of it.249
Still, tribes have had occasional success in trust litigation.  Fiduciary
claims against the executive branch have fared better than those against Con-
gress, particularly where Indians seek damages under money-mandating stat-
utes that impose a proprietary trust responsibility upon the United States to
manage property and resources.250  But this literal trust is hardly a model for
the broad theory of fiduciary government.  Sweeping appeals to the trust doc-
trine are common: “It is fairly clear,” the Ninth Circuit has said, “that any
Federal government action is subject to the United States’ fiduciary responsi-
248 Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 234–35 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
249 See, e.g., Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System Under the League of Nations as
Origin of Trusteeship, in 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 47, 50, 54 n.19
(2005); Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Econ-
omy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513, 558
(2002); Ashwini Tambe, Climate, Race Science and the Age of Consent in the League of Nations,
28 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 109, 110 (2011).  For a discussion of the racist origins of
federal Indian law, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of
Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 51, 52 (1991) (“The racist law which Columbus and other Europeans brought to
the New World is still enforced and applied as the law of the colonizer and colonized in the
United States.”).
250 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (holding that statutorily
established trust responsibility implied tribal right to sue).  An earlier decision, United
States v. Mitchell, held that the General Allotment Act did not by itself imply a right of
action for damages.  445 U.S. 535, 546 (1980).
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bilities toward Indian tribes.”251  But, as is the case with the gap between
private fiduciary law’s aspirations and its legally enforceable rules, the law on
the ground is different.  Where Indians have succeeded in broader trust
claims, it is largely because courts have construed the trust as synonymous
with the executive’s statutory responsibility to engage in reasoned administra-
tive decisionmaking under the APA.252  And the cases that take the opposite
view strike a tone discordant with the Court’s recent Jicarilla decision: in
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, for example, the district court held the
Bureau of Land Management to a special fiduciary duty, reasoning the
agency’s “conflicting responsibilities” under the governing statute “do not
relieve [it] of [its] trust obligations.”253
Even with judicial review, moreover, the United States has an appallingly
dismal track record in meeting its fiduciary obligations.  Notwithstanding
Congress’s repeated pronouncements in favor of the trust, and a tradition
(since Richard Nixon) of presidential affirmations, the Department of Inte-
rior has mismanaged billions of dollars worth of Indian assets.  The Depart-
ment of Justice has consistently resisted imposition of fiduciary constraints in
the courts.  And the Court, as Jicarilla suggests, has often forgiven the execu-
tive branch’s fiduciary failures.  As Kevin Gover, the former Assistant Secre-
tary for Indian Affairs, put it, “the three branches have together created a
largely useless trust.”254  Many Indian tribes would like to get out from under
the trust relationship in the interests of economic development, believing
that they can better manage their resources without an elaborate federal
guardianship.255
It remains an open question whether Indian tribes would be better off
without the trust doctrine than with it, but not because fiduciary government
can fulfill the promises made in its name.  Rather, the Indian trust doctrine is
embedded in federal common law and provides some, albeit inconsistent,
constraints on the United States when it comes to its treaty obligations to
Indians.  In particular, the trust relationship is often cited as the basis for
preemption of state authority over tribal lands and resources,256 and in sup-
port for a canon of treaty and statutory construction that favors Indians in
251 Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981).
252 See Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355,
363–64 (2003).
253 N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 3065, 3071 (D. Mont. 1985).
254 Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 317,
356 (2006).
255 One might object that the Indian trust context is an inapt comparison to fiduciary
government on the theory that federal Indian law is exceptional.  There are two reasons
the comparison is appropriate.  First, some fiduciary theorists rely upon it in justifying
fiduciary government. See Criddle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 169.  Second, in many R
cases, Indians invoke the trust relationship to make claims upon the government that mir-
ror those others might make, as in the APA cases discussed in the text.
256 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
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cases of ambiguous terms.257  But in elaborating these doctrines, the courts
have not looked to private fiduciary law.  Preemption of state authority can
be explained as an incident of incorporating the tribes within the constitu-
tional structure, and the canon favoring Indians is consistent with the treaty
relationship between the two sovereigns.258  Vindicating the interests of Indi-
ans does not require a fiduciary doctrine that does not limit Congress, often
serves as a shield, not a sword, and leads to internally incoherent outcomes.
2. The Public Trust Doctrine
Many of the same problems have arisen in the public trust context.  The
federal public trust doctrine is first and foremost a property rule against
privatization of public resources.  The Court’s 1892 decision in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois259 is the “lodestar” of the public trust doctrine.260  In
that case, the Court held that the state of Illinois did not have the authority
to grant a railway company title to the bed of Lake Michigan because the
state held title in trust for its citizens to ensure common access for navigation
and fishing.261  According to the conventional history, the King of England
held navigable waters and the land submerged beneath them subject to this
public trust, which devolved onto the thirteen states following the Revolu-
tion.  Under the equal footing doctrine, each new state acceded to the same
public trust, with its limitations on alienation, upon admission to the
Union.262
The Illinois Central rule thus protects a limited public right in submerged
lands and navigable waterways.  Navigable waters are a quintessential “mixed
asset” that presents particularly difficult problems of balancing public access
in the interests of interstate commerce with private development where nec-
essary to maximize public use of the resource.263 Illinois Central’s resort to
trust principles to limit alienation of submerged lands attempted to ensure a
favorable mix of “access-enhancing” public control and private development
with respect to a “uniquely vexed resource.”264
It is worth pausing to consider how “radical” even that limited doctrine
of public rights is.265  Conventionally Anglo-American law has embraced pri-
257 See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
258 See, e.g., DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 135–40 (2001); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past
and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 381, 412–13 (1993).
259 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
260 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970).
261 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
262 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012).
263 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 928–29 (2004).
264 Id.
265 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 716 (1986).
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vate property rights as leading to the most fruitful uses of resources.  Property
law gives individuals a right to exclude others so as “to ensure that the person
who places the highest value” on a resource can control its use.266  The fed-
eral public trust does not fit within that framework: it is neither a private
right to exclude others, nor a system of state ownership designed to respond
to a market failure.267
In Illinois Central the Court was opaque about the source of the doctrine,
likely because in a pre-Erie world the question mattered little.  Scholars have
struggled to pin down what authorizes federal courts to recognize public
trust constraints.  Most importantly, courts have not applied the public trust
doctrine to Congress or the executive.  That has “substantial, practical signifi-
cance,” because the United States manages a wide range of natural resources,
particularly in the American West.268  There is no constitutional hook for
imposing the doctrine on the political branches.  Nor would the modern
understanding of federal common law, which is confined to a few enclaves
and certain conflicts between state law and federal concerns, support a judge-
made trust constraint.269  Moreover, Congress’s extensive legislation in the
area likely would displace this federal common law.270
Federal courts’ refusal to fashion public trust constraints on congres-
sional and executive action highlights fiduciary government’s legitimacy
problem.  That neither courts nor scholars have reached anything approach-
ing consensus regarding the legal source of the narrow public trust doctrine
suggests that a broader federal doctrine of fiduciary government cannot be
founded in positive law.
State experiments with broader public trust doctrines underscore the
functional problems with fiduciary government.  Any generalizations about
266 Tessa Davis, Keeping the Welcome Mat Rolled-Up: Social Justice Theorists’ Failure to Embrace
Adverse Possession as a Redistributive Tool, 20 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 73, 76 (2011).
267 See Rose, supra note 265, at 720.
268 See Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its
Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 680 (2012) (explaining that federal government owns
nearly half of California’s land area and 90% of Nevada’s area).
269 See supra note 146.
270 The Supreme Court’s latest foray into public nuisance law underscores judicial
reluctance to elaborate common law environmental policy.  In American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut, several states, New York City, and private plaintiffs sued on a public nuisance
theory to cap the carbon-dioxide emissions of several power companies, including the fed-
eral Tennessee Valley Authority.  The Court dismissed their claim, holding that Congress
had addressed the problem through the Clean Air Act and thus displaced “the need
for . . . law-making by federal courts.”  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527,
2537 (2011) (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981)).  As Richard Lazarus
has argued, the growth of environmental statutes since the 1970s has similarly displaced
the need for public trust constraints on environmental policymaking. See Richard J. Laza-
rus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public
Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 631–33 (1986).  Or, to press the point, what warrant is
there for federal courts to elaborate broad fiduciary constraints on federal policymaking
without a textual or doctrinal hook? But cf. Rave, supra note 4, at 721 (arguing that “tex- R
tual or doctrinal hook” for treating politicians as fiduciaries does not matter).
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the fifty states’ laws must be made with care, of course.  The majority of states
still hew to relatively narrow versions of the doctrine, limiting it to restraints
on privatization of water resources.271  In some states the doctrine has
expanded through common lawmaking, constitutional amendment, or statu-
tory enactment to reach beyond navigable waterways and to impose procedu-
ral and substantive constraints on environmental policymaking.272
Expansion of the public trust doctrine springs from Joseph Sax’s famous
1970 defense of the doctrine.  In Sax’s vision, the trust requires the state to
take a hard look at the environmental impacts of its regulatory policies and
to protect certain natural resources against private exploitation.  The virtue
of the public trust doctrine lies, Sax argued, in its “support for whatever deci-
sion a court might wish to adopt.”273  By imposing certain decisionmaking
procedures and substantive limits on resource allocation, courts could “pro-
mote equality of political power for a disorganized and diffuse majority”
against “self-interested and powerful minorities [who] often have an undue
influence” on environmental policy.274
The reach of this modern public trust remains vague, however.  As Bill
Araiza points out, there is no meaningful limiting principle to Sax’s represen-
tation-reinforcing account.  Many public interests are disorganized and “dif-
fuse,” not just environmental protection.275  There has been no shortage of
commentary applying Sax’s theory to an ever-greater range of water, land,
air, wildlife, and man-made resources.276  Why stop there?  The structural
concern that Sax identified—that the political process may favor special
interest groups over public interest groups—exists “whenever the public’s
interest can be described as diffuse.”277  Why not then apply public trust con-
straints to consumer protection?  To education policy?  To questions of mili-
tary defense, traditionally subject to little or no judicial review?  It is difficult
271 See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doc-
trines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 58 (2010) (discussing variation in western states’ treatment of broad
public trust doctrine).
272 Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 707–08 (2006) (discussing how states have
expanded public trust doctrine as matter of common law and positive enactment).
273 Sax, supra note 260, at 553.
274 Id. at 560.
275 William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional
Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 385, 422 (1997).
276 Perhaps the most ambitious use of the doctrine concerns judicial solutions to global
climate change.  Unless and until governments reach a multilateral, treaty-based solution,
the argument runs, domestic judiciaries should treat political inaction as a breach of the
public trust responsibility to preserve the planet’s climate. See Wood, Part II, supra note 4, R
at 111–24.  In the United States, however, the prospects for this atmospheric trust at the
federal level appear dim. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
277 Araiza, supra note 275, at 437.
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to see a cabining principle for the doctrine, other than historical accident,278
or a simple preference for environmental interests.279
The principle limiting public trust requirements is also elusive.  That is
particularly true once the doctrine expands beyond Illinois Central’s restraint
on alienation of “inherently public property”280 to what Robin Kundis Craig
has labeled the “ecological public trust” doctrine.281  On the one hand, the
ecological public trust promises to force state governments to take care with
the regulation and use of natural resources.  On the other hand, the doctrine
has largely served to empower state governments to affect private property
rights.  The public trust provides a defense to private landowners’ challenges
to regulation, which has led to a cottage industry of doctrinal criticism.
Although some of this criticism is overheated,282 the vagueness of the doc-
trine gives it bite.  In theory, there can be no taking of public trust property
because any individual landowner gains rights to it subject to the trust.283
But in practice, the uncertain and shifting contours of the ecological public
trust can undermine property owners’ reasonable expectations regarding
their rights.  Indeed, one need not look beyond the narrow confines of Illi-
nois Central to see that the trust concept’s implications for judicial enforce-
ment of private rights are far from clear.  There, as in the case of the
ecological public trust, fiduciary government expands public power at the
expense of private rights.
This indeterminacy is built into the public trust analogy.  As Carol Rose
has explained, the public trust doctrine has “gravitated between two different
definitions of the public: the public as governmental authority, whose ability
to manage and dispose of trust property is plenary, and the public at large,
which . . . has . . . rights that may be asserted even against its own representa-
tives.”284  Fiduciary theorists emphasize the latter understanding, but, as both
the Indian and public trust contexts show, the former is immanent in treat-
ing government as a fiduciary.285
278 See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 2 (2007) (“American public trust law . . . is
founded on a New Jersey decision that misunderstood the Roman and English history and
contradicted the contemporary law and practice of that state.”).
279 See Araiza, supra note 275, at 438–51.
280 Rose, supra note 265, at 739.
281 Craig, supra note 271, at 71.
282 Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 418–21 (1987) (rec-
onciling takings and public trust doctrines).
283 See, e.g., Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. 1972).
284 Rose, supra note 265, at 739.
285 See James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 543 (1989) (“A trust relationship would . . . constrain[ ] the
ability of the people to control the state.”).
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3. The First Amendment Public Forum
The First Amendment’s public forum doctrine protects rights to speech
in certain public spaces, such as streets and parks.  The Court has justified
protecting speech in public fora in fiduciary terms. Hague v. Congress of
Industrial Organizations provides the foundational statement: “[S]treets and
parks . . . have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”286  As a “funda-
mental premise” of First Amendment law,287 this public trust has spawned
decades of judicial confusion.
The public forum doctrine is a notorious mess.  The black letter law is
easy enough to state.  A government may restrict speech in public through
narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions that serve a significant
government purpose and leave open sufficient channels of communication.
Content-based regulation of speech in a public forum must satisfy strict scru-
tiny.  But applying the black letter law is anything but easy.  Scholars have
received the jurisprudence with “nearly universal condemnation.”288  One
leading commentator has called it “virtually impermeable to common
sense.”289  Others describe it as “an edifice now so riven with incoherence
and fine distinctions that it is on the verge of collapse.”290
Why is the public forum doctrine such a muddle?  Part of the answer is
disagreement among jurists on the reasons for protecting speech in public
fora.  But I doubt that the problems would be solved if courts consistently
applied the trust analogy.  By pointing to the property-focused concept of the
trust, the public trust analogy invites the doctrine’s ever-finer parsing of types
of property—“quintessential public forums,” “limited-purpose” public fora,
nonpublic fora, and so on, each with greater or lesser speech rights and gov-
ernment duties—which “serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at
hand.”291  And because this approach invites consideration of the “govern-
ment’s desire to control its ‘property,’”292 it serves in uncertain ways—as we
have seen in the Indian and public trust contexts—to empower rather than to
restrain government regulation of private rights.293
286 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460, 469 (2009) (repeating public trust conception of public forum doctrine).
287 Timothy Zick, Summum, The Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, 2010 BYU
L. REV. 2203, 2205 (labeling public trust conception “fundamental premise” of public
forum doctrine).
288 ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 199 (1995).
289 Id.
290 Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2001).
291 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 740–41 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
292 Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1979 (2011).
293 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 740–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that parsing types
of fora has led to “upholding restrictions on speech”).
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Nowhere is that more evident than in the current trend towards displac-
ing the public forum doctrine with a doctrine upholding “government
speech.”  In Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,294 for example, the Court
held that a city could exclude a private religious monument from a city-
owned park.  The public forum doctrine did not apply, the Court held, even
while acknowledging that Hague had labeled “streets and parks” as being
“‘held in trust for the use of the public.’”295  Placing monuments on city
property involved government speech, which the government, as owner,
could control.  “The State, no less than a private owner of property,” as the
Court put it in Adderley v. Florida, “has power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”296  In applying similar
reasoning to hold that public trust principles do not apply to a quintessential
public forum, Summum underscores the fragility of fiduciary government.
In some cases fiduciary models restrict government behavior too much,
in others too little.297  These are perennial problems in public law, which
294 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
295 Id. at 469 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)).
296 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).  Timothy Zick has argued that the public forum doctrine
holds that “[a]ll members of the community are entitled to enjoy this portion of the trust
corpus on equal terms.”  Timothy Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 1361, 1418 (2010).  I am less hopeful than Zick that the trust conception can fulfill
that promise.  In any event, the analogy resolves only an Illinois Central-type case of priva-
tization of public trust property.
297 Fiduciary government has not fared much better in other common law countries.
The Canadian courts have rejected broad doctrines of fiduciary government. See FOX-
DECENT, supra note 4, at 157 (noting that “in Canada . . . the fiduciary principle has only R
limited application to public law”).  In Harris v. Canada, for instance, the court reasoned
that “where duties are owed to a number of interests it is less likely that the Crown owes
fiduciary obligations.”  (2001), [2002] 2 F.C. 484, 550 (Can.); see FOX-DECENT, supra note 4,
at 156–57 (citing Harris).  Australia has a very narrow doctrine of fiduciary duties in private
law and treats equity in general, and fiduciary government in particular, as inconsistent
with the judicial role. See Paul Finn, Public Trusts and Fiduciary Relations, in FIDUCIARY DUTY
AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST, supra note 4, at 31, 34–36 (“By the mid-nineteenth century it
had become characteristic of English law and now even more of Australian law that, when
the language of trust was used to describe the responsibility of government and its agen-
cies, it was seen as a political metaphor and so imposing only a moral or political obliga-
tion.”).  English courts have also usually rejected fiduciary government based upon
attentiveness to its remedial implications.  In Swain v. Law Society, for example, the House
of Lords expressly refused to treat the government as a fiduciary.  Lord Brightman
explained, “the nature of a public duty and the remedies of those who seek to challenge
the manner in which it is performed differ markedly from the nature of a private duty and
the remedies of those who say that the private duty has been breached.”  Swain v. Law
Soc’y, [1982] 2 All E.R. 827, 837–38 (H.L.); see also Windsor Roman Catholic Separate Sch.
Bd. v. Windsor, [1988] 64 O.R. 2d 241, 246 (Can.) (applying Swain as matter of Canadian
law).
In a few cases involving challenges to municipal taxation and spending English courts
have been more amenable to fiduciary government. See, e.g., Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925]
All E.R. 24 (H.L.) (holding that borough had violated law by paying wages above market
rate).  Fiduciary theorists cannot make much of these cases for the American context,
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broad doctrines of fiduciary government exacerbate.  As Part V will show,
proposed fiduciary reforms are subject to this functional objection, as well as
the problems of fit and intent.
V. THE PROBLEMS WITH THREE PROPOSED FIDUCIARY REFORMS
A. Imposing the Duty of Care on Congress
Consider first the proposal to apply, through the vehicle of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, a requirement that Congress “undertake appropriate
factual and legal investigations” prior to acting.298  This requirement follows
from the fiduciary duty of care, and could be based upon an analogy to trust
or corporate law.  The proposal is not as radical as it sounds at first.  In partic-
ular, it recalls the Court’s congruence and proportionality test for § 5 legisla-
tion under City of Boerne v. Flores.  That test precludes Congress from
legislating to prevent Fourteenth Amendment violations unless it adopts
means that are congruent and proportional to the Fourteenth Amendment
evil it seeks to correct.299  As elaborated by the Court, the Boerne test requires
Congress to point to evidence of a Fourteenth Amendment wrong that
demands correction.
The Boerne test has come under substantial criticism. Boerne imposes
upon Congress what Philip Frickey and Steven Smith called a “legislative
deliberation model” similar to the APA’s requirement of reasoned decision-
making.300  It suggests judicial review should look to the quality of congres-
sional deliberation.  The model suffers from several problems of fit, as
Frickey and Smith described.  For one, Congress is a “they,” not an “it” that
can unitarily deliberate.301  Second, and relatedly, congressional representa-
tives do not assemble and consider evidence; according to rules of congres-
sional procedure, support agencies, staff, committees, and so on assemble
the legislative record.  Moreover, the two houses of Congress deliberate sepa-
rately and generate their own reports regarding contemplated legislation.
And “neither house acts collectively”; instead, much of what passes for a
house’s action is in significant measure the product of a few members and
their staff.302  Setting boundaries around the legislative record is also a prob-
because there are reasons to distinguish municipal from national governments.  Tradition-
ally, municipalities were corporations, which creates an obvious tether for imposing fiduci-
ary duties in that setting.  Moreover, in many instances municipalities govern a narrower
set of interests and a more homogeneous population.  But even there, “[n]othing is more
dangerous than [judges’] use of the authority committed to them to suppress views or
experiments they happen to dislike,” which, if cases like Hopwood are any indication, fiduci-
ary government invites them to do.  Harold J. Laski, Judicial Review of Social Policy in
England: A Study of Roberts v. Hopwood et. al, 39 HARV. L. REV. 832, 846 (1926).
298 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1089.
299 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
300 Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1709 (2002).
301 Id. at 1731.
302 Id. at 1733.
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lem: Does it include all the information that legislators have before them but
that does not make it into committee reports, hearing testimony, or floor
debate?303  In short, Congress has a vast fact-finding apparatus.  But it is far
from clear that there is a meaningful and determinate way in which a court
can measure whether Congress has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.
Turning bicameralism and presentment into notice-and-comment
rulemaking is no more sound under the Necessary and Proper Clause than it
is under § 5.  Indeed, so long as McCulloch remains good law, there is no
warrant for it.
B. Judicial Review of Political Gerrymandering
A second fiduciary reform, grounded in an analogy to the safe harbor
statute of Delaware corporate law, would impose strict scrutiny upon legisla-
tive redistricting unless it is done by an independent redistricting commis-
sion.304  In corporate law self-dealing is permissible when the principals give
informed consent or the transaction is subject to review by disinterested deci-
sionmakers.  Drawing upon this framework, Rave argues that, much like cor-
porate directors engaged in self-interested transactions, incumbent
politicians harm the public by violating their duty of loyalty when they seek to
entrench themselves or their political allies against electoral challenge.
Courts should therefore strictly scrutinize decisions, such as redistricting,
that entrench incumbents, unless, as in the case of corporate safe harbors,
politicians cleanse the taint of self-interest by delegating the decisions to dis-
interested reviewers.
The problem of intent looms large here.  “The textual or doctrinal hook
for any particular claim is not all that important to this framework,” Rave
argues.305  Rave relies upon Natelson’s account of the original understand-
ing to argue that federal courts should hold that elected officials breach a
fiduciary duty of loyalty when they “manipulate election laws to their own
advantage,” as in, for example, “gerrymandering in state legislatures.”306  But
Natelson acknowledges that, at most, the Constitution imposes fiduciary
duties upon state officials in an “ad hoc” manner.307  On interpretivist
grounds, then, it is unclear what warrant federal courts have to police state
redistricting decisions under a fiduciary model.
The problem is more acute than that, however.  Rave adopts a con-
tractarian account of fiduciary duties.308  Such an account admits of the pos-
sibility of contractual modification.  Therefore, constitutional modification of
the standard package of fiduciary duties should be permissible.  And it is per-
303 Id. at 1733–34.
304 See Rave, supra note 4, at 679.
305 Id. at 721.
306 Id. at 677–78, 710–11.
307 Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 4, at 1173 n.430.
308 Rave, supra note 4, at 708.
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fectly plausible to think our redistricting system, as reflected in the “[United
States] and state constitutions[,] tell[s] legislators that they may self-deal.”309
There is also the problem of fit.  A state legislator participating in a
redistricting decision could be considered a fiduciary for those who voted for
her, her district, her state, or the nation as a whole.  It is far from clear that
she would violate a duty of loyalty to the nation, for example, even if she
voted for a districting plan that would improve her odds of re-election.
Moreover, it is even less clear that her decisions regarding congressional dis-
tricts would present a conflict of interest, unless, as Rave insists, and contrary
to the trend in corporate law, a benefit to a member of her party is tanta-
mount to a benefit to her.310
What about the problem of function?  A plurality of the Court in Vieth v.
Jubelirer treated partisan gerrymandering as non-justiciable for lack of judi-
cially manageable standards.311  Rave argues that the creation of a safe har-
bor mitigates the separation-of-powers problem.312  But it is hard to see why
that would be.  Not only do “legislators possess crucial information about rel-
evant constituencies and their distinctive problems,”313 but also “it is almost
impossible to design institutions to be authentically nonpartisan and politi-
cally disinterested.”314  Who will sit on the redistricting commission?
Appointees who, like their legislative principals, will likely be members of
political parties.  If Rave is correct that the fiduciary problem arises because
of party affiliation, it is not clear that the creation of a commission will satisfy
it.
C. Hardening Hard Look Review of Agency Action
Various formulations of the duty of care in private law enjoin the fiduci-
ary to act with the attentiveness and deliberativeness of a “reasonable,” “ordi-
nary,” or “prudent” person, but the content of this duty varies with the
circumstances.  On one account, applying the duty of care to public officials
would simply replicate existing standards of judicial review.  For example, the
APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard already requires agencies “to compe-
tently exercise” their “lawmaking powers.”315  It is hard to see what is gained
by placing old wine into new bottles here.
More ambitiously, the fiduciary analogy would alter reasonableness
review based upon the contextual approach of private law.  Where, for exam-
ple, “the political branches’ formal constraints on agency behavior are
weak”—as in the case, for example, of independent agencies—fiduciary theo-
309 Leib et al., Translating, supra note 147, at 97.
310 See id. at 97–99.
311 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion).
312 See Rave, supra note 4, at 705.
313 Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122
YALE L.J. 384, 404 (2012).
314 Nathaniel Persily, Reply: In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 674 (2002).
315 Mantel, supra note 4, at 363–64.
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rists would have courts “apply” the duty of care “more rigorously.”316  And
they would expand judicial review of agency action by, among other altera-
tions, amending the APA to increase the procedural requirements for, and
eliminate the exceptions to, informal rulemaking.317
The objections from fit and intent are by this point familiar.  Function-
ally, the ossification critique of expanded hard look review points to the
many instances in which “it can take many years for an agency to create a
significant, controversial rule via notice-and-comment.”318  Hard look review
also alters the power dynamics within an agency, perhaps to the detriment of
rational decisionmaking.  It can empower attorneys at the expense of experts
and lead agency officials to delegate the decisionmaking process to private
consultants who have the time to prepare a record that will pass review.319
Call this the last functional objection to fiduciary government: the unin-
tended consequence of hardening hard look review may be to empower spe-
cial interests at the expense of the public.
VI. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSLATING BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
The problems of fit, intent, and function highlight the difficulties of
translating between public and private law.  Although there is a wealth of
commentary on comparative law,320 and a growing literature on constitu-
tional law borrowing across doctrinal areas,321 there is little modern com-
mentary on translating between public and private law.  Perhaps this gap
arises because the common wisdom treats “[a]ll law [as] public law.”322  But
with the emergence of a “new private law” that argues it “is erroneous to treat
private law as just a species of public regulation,”323 it is worth considering
the problem of translating between the two fields anew.  This Part discusses
several considerations that should drive doctrinal borrowing.
316 Criddle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 178–79.
317 See Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 448, 486–87.
318 Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out
About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 15 (2009).
319 See Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 928–29 (2007).
320 See, e.g., David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 333–34 (2010) (discussing literature); Mark Tushnet,
The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1257–85 (1999) (distin-
guishing between comparative constitutional theories).
321 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 674 (2011) (discussing borrowing across criminal and
civil contexts in development of exclusionary rule); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Consti-
tutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463–64 (2010) (describing doctrinal develop-
ment through borrowing across different areas of black-letter law).
322 George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary—and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L. REV. 279, 289
(2002).
323 John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1658–59 (2012).
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A. The Interdependence of Justiciability, Rights, and Remedies
Perhaps the most important lesson of the false promise of fiduciary gov-
ernment is that doctrinal translation must take account of the interdepen-
dence of justiciability, rights, and remedies.  Both private and public law
scholars have mapped this interdependence.  As Richard Fallon has argued,
“analysis goes wrong at the outset if it assumes that the substantive content”
of rights is “fixed” regardless of changes in remedies, defenses, and jus-
ticiability doctrines.324
Consider first the fiduciary law of justiciability, which is equilibrated to
provide remedies to beneficiaries against fiduciaries.  Public law doctrines of
justiciability are not similarly equilibrated.  Instead, they turn upon different
considerations of judicial competence, tradition, and the separation of
powers.
The fiduciary law of standing springs from the duty of loyalty.  Consider,
for example, trust law.  The standing of a beneficiary to sue a trustee for
enforcement of a private trust is uncontroversial.325  Standing arises “by vir-
tue of the fiduciary relationship,” and, while based in the beneficiary’s equita-
ble property interest, is not dependent upon an “absolute entitlement or
probability of receiving trust assets.”326  The difficult questions concern who
counts as a beneficiary.  Holders of beneficial interests obviously qualify, but
it is less clear, for instance, whether an advisor has standing to enforce the
trust, even where the trust documents empower her to advise the trustee.327
But where a recognized beneficiary sues a trustee for breach of a fiduciary
duty, the requisites for standing are usually satisfied.328
The standing of beneficiaries in public law has never been so straightfor-
ward.  Under the “private-law model” that dominated the law of standing
from the New Deal through the early 1960s, regulated parties had standing to
challenge agency action, but regulatory beneficiaries did not.329  Their rem-
edy laid, if at all, with the political process.  Thus, the standing of regulated
parties has never been in doubt even though it is awkward to think of them as
“beneficiaries” of government restrictions on their property and liberty
interests.
Modern standing doctrine is also inconsistent with the fiduciary analogy.
As a constitutional matter, a plaintiff must show she suffered an injury-in-fact,
which the defendant caused and which would be redressable by a favorable
324 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 479, 480 (2011).
325 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(1) (2011); HESS ET AL., supra note 92,
§ 861.
326 Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2012).
327 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94, cmt. b.
328 The broadest exception involves standing to sue the trustees of charitable trusts.
Traditionally only the state attorney general has standing to enforce the fiduciary duties of
charitable trustees. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the
Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 657 (1998).
329 Sunstein, supra note 203, at 1433.
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decision.330  The prudential constraints are also familiar: the plaintiff must
sue to protect her own interests, not those of someone else; cannot sue to
vindicate a generalized grievance; and must be within the zone of interests of
the relevant statute or constitutional provision.331  The modern Court has
construed these requirements to restrict the standing of regulatory benefi-
ciaries, citing concerns over judicial competence in matters of general public
concern,332 the President’s authority to “take Care” to execute the laws,333
and the potential pathologies of private enforcement.334
The gap between fiduciary standing and public law standing is nicely
illustrated by comparing the standing of co-trustees with the restrictions
upon legislator standing.  Co-trustees (as well as successor trustees) may, and,
in some cases must, sue one another for breach of the trust obligations run-
ning to the beneficiaries.335  There is no such doctrine in the public law of
standing.  Then-Judge Robert Bork was only somewhat overstating the matter
when he wrote: “When the interest sought to be asserted is one of govern-
mental power, there can be no congressional standing, however con-
fined.”336  More generally, policing disagreements among politicians and
bureaucrats as joint-trustees of the public “lies far from the model of the
traditional common-law cause of action at the conceptual core” of modern
standing doctrine.337
Doctrines of non-reviewability in public law similarly depart from the
beneficiary-centered framework of fiduciary law.  Regulatory beneficiaries
commonly call upon the courts for more regulatory action, including to com-
pel agencies to enforce regulations.  Under the common law, an agency’s
decision not to enforce its regulations was presumptively unreviewable.  In
Heckler v. Chaney, the Court adopted this common law rule as the governing
presumption in APA suits, citing concerns over comparative institutional
competence and the separation of powers.338  The Court distinguished a
beneficiary suit from a regulated party’s challenge to an “exercise [of] coer-
cive power,” which is presumptively justiciable.339  Thus the doctrine of non-
reviewability empowers regulated parties at the expense of regulatory benefi-
330 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007).
331 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
332 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 600.
333 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
334 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982).
335 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81(2) (2007) (“Each trustee . . . has a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of trust and, if a breach
of trust occurs, to obtain redress.”).
336 Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 68 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting).
337 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997).
338 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see Sunstein, supra note 203, at 1459 (noting that Court
has shown “hostility” to beneficiary suits in nonreviewability doctrine).
339 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
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ciaries.  It is hard to square that preference with the fiduciary theory of
government.340
It is equally, if not more difficult, to square fiduciary remedies with those
available in public law.  Common remedies for breach of fiduciary duty are
disgorgement, restitution, and punitive damages, and can include judicial
removal of a fiduciary.341  These remedies are a far cry from the prospective
injunction that is part and parcel of modern public law litigation.
Courts have calibrated fiduciary law as part of a complex structure of
jurisdictional and remedial rules.  As Ethan Leib puts it, “[O]ne might even
be tempted to define the entire field of fiduciary law by the remedies
extracted from fiduciaries.”342  Public law also has its own assortment of juris-
dictional and remedial doctrines.  To treat politicians and bureaucrats as
fiduciaries requires more than a claim that they are, or should be, subject to
similar primary rights and duties.  It requires also a theory for equilibrating
jurisdictional and remedial doctrines in public law to the fiduciary model.
That theory has not been forthcoming.343  When stripped of its characteristic
remedies, it is unclear how fiduciary law would function as a source for public
law doctrines.
340 Criddle has argued that constraints on beneficiary suits are consistent with an anal-
ogy between public law and the corporate law doctrine that limits shareholder suits.  Crid-
dle, Foundations, supra note 4, at 175.  Under corporate law, shareholders may bring R
derivative suits on behalf of the corporation to enforce the directors’ duties of loyalty and
care.  Before suing in a derivative capacity, however, a shareholder must either demand
that the corporate board cause the corporation to sue, or show that the demand would be
futile because the board would be unable to consider whether to sue in good faith. See,
e.g., Fagin v. Gilmartin, 432 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing influential Delaware
law, including Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)).  Limiting shareholder suits thus
is thought to protect against over-enforcement and frivolous lawsuits. Aronson, 473 A.2d at
811–12 (“[T]he demand requirement . . . exists at the threshold, first to insure that a
stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a safeguard against
strike suits.”), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
Although Article III standing doctrine is often explained in similar terms, the similar-
ity is superficial.  The analogy to derivative suits cannot explain why regulated parties have
greater standing than beneficiaries.  Regulated parties are often special interest groups
with greater access to political processes than regulatory beneficiaries and, correspond-
ingly, less of a need for a “direct” rather than a “derivative” right to sue. See Nicholas
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1260, 1286 (2006) (“[W]ell-organized industry groups that stand to gain from a reduction
in burdensome regulations will normally provoke an antiregulatory response from the
administrative state.” (citing OLSON, supra note 33, at 9–16)).
341 See Leib, supra note 79, at 678.
342 Id.
343 Evan Criddle briefly considers the problem, suggesting that courts should have a
“larger set of tools for remedying agency malfeasance” based upon the fiduciary theory.
Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 4, at 161.  It is far from clear, however, that adop- R
tion of fiduciary remedies would leave fiduciary rights intact.  As Richard Fallon has
argued, expansion of the available remedies may motivate retrenchment on the scope of
rights. See Fallon, supra note 324, at 480.
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Consider disgorgement and restitution.  (This is not the place to delve
into the debate over the conceptual relationship between the two.)344  As
Deborah DeMott puts it, the distinctiveness of fiduciary law lays in its prohibi-
tion upon “misappropriating or misusing entrusted property or power” and
in the “distinctive remedy” of disgorgement “available to the beneficiary.”345
“So singular is this remedial consequence of a fiduciary obligation that one
English judge made the disgorgement principle the hallmark of a fiduciary
relationship.”346  The disgorgement remedy requires a fiduciary to hand over
profits obtained in violation of the duty of loyalty.  It is measured by the fidu-
ciary’s gain, not the beneficiary’s loss.  And the remedy is available whether
or not the beneficiary suffered a harm from the fiduciary’s ill-gotten
profit.347
By contrast, litigants cannot typically obtain damages, much less dis-
gorgement or restitution, in suits challenging the federal government’s
actions.  Rather, declaratory or injunctive relief is the common remedy.  The
United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit.  It has waived that immu-
nity for some claims arising in contract and tort, but these waivers would not
extend to the award of disgorgement remedies for breach of general fiduci-
ary duties of care and loyalty.348  Moreover, in contrast with the fiduciary law
of disgorgement, under the harmless error rule a court may deny a remedy
even when the government has violated the law.349  These remedial restric-
tions reflect the hard questions that arise in remedying public law wrongs,
where courts balance claims of individual rights against competing public
interests.  The existing suite of fiduciary remedies is not designed to give
nuanced answers to these hard questions.  Instead, fiduciary remedies follow
inextricably from the private duties they enforce.
Yet fiduciary theorists tend to treat fiduciary rights and duties as trans-
portable from the context of private law remedies to that of public law.  An
alternative approach to translating between private and public law would
344 The recently completed Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment treats
restitution and unjust enrichment as a unique right of action, distinguishing it from dis-
gorgement as one type of remedy. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 1191, 1196–97 (1995) (arguing, in article by Restatement reporter, that the “law of
restitution be defined exclusively in terms of its core idea, the law of unjust enrichment”);
Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory Dam-
ages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 983–89 (2011) (discussing the
Restatement’s effort).
345 Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 851, 852
(2011).
346 E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in
Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1356 (1985) (referring to Ex parte Dale & Co., 11 Ch.
D. 772, 778 (1879)).
347 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV.
559, 563 (2006).
348 See Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and
Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 611 (2003).
349 See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (discussing “harmless error” rule
applied in government litigation).
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begin with the difficult questions of fit that arise from the interdependence
of justiciability, rights, and remedies.  Take, for example, the suggestion that
the fiduciary duty of impartiality bars Congress from special interest spend-
ing.350  In considering whether this thick translation is appropriate we
should consider it alongside the difficult questions of standing and remedies
it would necessarily raise.  When, if ever, could a private party colorably
allege a redressable injury-in-fact to challenge special interest spending that
benefitted someone else?  Would imposing a duty of impartiality on Congress
lead courts to tighten up public law standing even further?  If so, how might
that spill over in undesirable ways to constrict standing elsewhere?
B. The Importance of Mediating Principles
To answer these questions, it is necessary to attend to the techniques
that one doctrinal area uses to mediate between its general principles and
decision rules for particular cases.  Fiduciary law embraces abstract moral
injunctions of loyalty and care.  If the sine qua non of a fiduciary relationship
is entrustment and the attendant vulnerability of the entrustor, then the
scope and shape of judicial review should vary with the scope and shape of
entrustment and vulnerability.  The bite of fiduciary duties lies in the specific
applications that, over time, develop into decision rules that specify the
legally enforceable aspects of the aspirational duties of care and loyalty.  This
process occurs by reference to discrete classes of beneficiaries and discerni-
ble maximands.  Thus, in trust law the prudent investor rule makes the duties
of loyalty and care concrete.  Without meaningful analogues in problems of
public governance, fiduciary law simply is not fit to guide the design of public
law.
C. Connecting Values Across Doctrinal Areas
Translating between rights and remedies in private and public law
depends upon connecting the values of one doctrinal area with another.  In
part, then, its legitimacy depends upon the problem of intent.  In part it also
depends upon fit.  As we have seen in the First Amendment context, for
example, fiduciary law has little connection with the values of constitutional
law.
Fiduciary theory in particular makes too little out of the reality of politi-
cal self-interest.  Representatives’ responsiveness to special interests may serve
the public interest by helping to input a diverse range of views and knowl-
edge into the lawmaking machine.  Legislators and the public suffer informa-
tion asymmetries compared to special interest groups.  Assuming a
sufficiently diverse distribution of responsiveness to different special interests
among legislators, factional politics might actually lead to a more even distri-
bution of political satisfaction across the electorate.351  The fiduciary theory
350 Natelson, supra note 42, at 242, 245.
351 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 373 (1983); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public
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of political ethics elides the potential benefits of special interest inputs into
the legislative process.
To be sure, partisan politics undoubtedly causes problems for the
Republic.  Think of the recent spate of fiscal showdowns between the Repub-
lican-controlled House of Representatives and the Democrat-controlled
White House and Senate.  Nor is the gridlock the only problem.  Single-party
control of the three branches can undermine checks and balances.  “[B]ut
[partisanship] also provides the energy necessary to fuel a vibrant democ-
racy.”352  Franita Tolson has argued that partisan gerrymandering is a politi-
cal safeguard of federalism; it allows states to use redistricting as a way of
influencing federal policy.353  Michael Kang has distinguished between
“offensive gerrymandering,” designed to make it tougher for the other
party’s candidate to obtain re-election, and “defensive gerrymandering,”
designed to entrench one’s preferred candidate, arguing that offensive gerry-
mandering is desirable as an anti-entrenchment device.354  Daryl Levinson
and Richard Pildes have outlined a theory of the “separation of parties, not
powers,” in which, under certain conditions, partisan strife substitutes for
structural checks and balances.355  All of which is to say that partisanship
“may be a normal, unavoidable, and perhaps even desirable byproduct of the
basic constitutional design of the American political system.”356
The fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to one’s beneficiaries is thus not
part of the “background conditions [that] underlie” public law’s “combina-
tion of ideas.”357  That is fatal to the translation necessary to realize the
promise of fiduciary government.
D. The Possibility of Creative Restatement
Nevertheless, might fiduciary government point towards a creative
restatement of problems in public governance?  In some instances, the aim of
translating between private and public law is not to transfer packages of
rights and duties, but rather to elaborate a problem in one context by refer-
ence to its discussion in another.  Levinson, for example, has looked to con-
tract and tort law to show how “decisions about rights or entitlements are
Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 64 (1990); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 737 (1983); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the
Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1250–51 (2006).
352 Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, De´ja` Vu All Over Again: Courts, Corporate Law,
and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86, 89 (2013).
353 Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 859, 860.
354 Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 443, 444 (2005).
355 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311, 2312 (2006).
356 David G. Oedel et al., Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congres-
sional Partisanship?, 54 VILL. L. REV. 57, 57 (2009).
357 Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 321, at 495.
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bound up with decisions about remedies,” and has then elaborated how the
content of constitutional rights is dependent upon constitutional reme-
dies.358  That does not entail borrowing private law’s rights and remedies for
use in public law, or vice versa.
The possibility of this form of creative restatement should not be surpris-
ing.  Legal reasoning is transversal, and problems and concepts that arise in
one doctrinal setting often arise in another.359  Fiduciary government
focuses upon a problem that arises in both private and public law, namely,
holding agents responsible to their principals.  Perhaps the promise of fiduci-
ary government rests not in its power to determine legal rights and duties,
but rather in its potential to illumine new problems or new solutions in the
design of public governance.
In my view, the problem of fit robs fiduciary government of the resolving
power necessary for a creative restatement of public law.  To make the fiduci-
ary account of government fit, it is necessary to draw a thin comparison
between public officials and private fiduciaries.  Taken as a modest analogy
between private fiduciaries and public officials—both, after all, are delegated
powers by others—the theory of fiduciary government simply restates peren-
nial problems in public law.  Consider, for example, the fiduciary principles
of solicitude and fairness.  The former requires government to treat citizens
“as ends in themselves and never as mere means,” Criddle explains, and the
latter mandates “‘due regard’” for affected parties and similar treatment of
those who are similarly situated.360  These concepts might be consistent with
legacy admissions in higher education,361 the “marriage penalty” in the Tax
Code,362 or prohibitions upon opticians’ businesses at the instance of the
optometrists’ lobby,363 but, then again, they might not be.364  Nothing in the
358 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 859 (1999).
359 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,
2–3 (1986); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 380
(1985).
360 See Criddle, Administration, supra note 4, at 477–78. R
361 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (opining that legacy admissions do not offend equal protec-
tion guarantee).
362 See Druker v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding marriage penalty
against equal protection challenge and reasoning that Congress had discretion to balance
“competing interests and accomplish fairness”).
363 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 485, 491 (1955).
364 See J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 315 n.96 (1989) (referring to
regulation challenged in Lee Optical as instance of “naked redistribution”); Nancy J.
Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 218–19 (1998)
(discussing “unfairness” of marriage penalty, including its “disparate impact . . . on the
working poor and African-Americans”); Steve D. Shadowen et al., No Distinctions Except
Those Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private Univer-
sities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 51, 54–55 (2009) (arguing that legacy admissions violate
equal protection guarantee).
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theory of fiduciary government seems to specify a new way of untying the
knotty problems that politics present in a constitutional democracy.365
CONCLUSION
I end where we began, with Francis Lieber’s ambition to develop a “sci-
ence of duties and virtues.”366  He defined civic virtue in terms that will be
familiar from the theory of fiduciary government: “The patriotic citizen acts
for the benefit of others; not for his interest, but because that sympathy and
impulse, patriotism, impels him to share dangers, to work out liberty for
those who are not yet born, to preserve liberty.”367  This other-regarding
impulse, which Lieber worked out largely in procedural rather than substan-
tive terms, has become a familiar feature of debates in contemporary political
ethics.368
This is not the place to extemporize on the relationship between politi-
cal ethics and legal rights, but it is worth noting the inevitably rough corre-
spondence between the two.  Consider, for example, the well-known
principle of political morality captured in the common law maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium: “Where there is a right, there is a remedy.”  The law has never fully
converged with this moral principle, and, if current doctrine is any indica-
tion, never will.369  The law’s imperfect commitment to the right-remedy
principle is telling, because the theory of fiduciary government would
expand judicial enforcement of Lieber’s political ethic.
The impulse towards fiduciary government is understandable.  To
address the problems of politics through the lens of fiduciary law is a nonob-
vious solution.
Fiduciary government cannot, however, fulfill the promise made in its
name.  Politicians and bureaucrats are not like private fiduciaries.  They do
not serve discrete classes of beneficiaries, and they are subject to demands
that cannot be distilled into a discrete maximand.  To translate private fiduci-
ary law into public law results either in resort to general principles that pro-
vide no helpful guidance or fiduciary doctrines that are an ill fit for public
law problems.  To the extent the Founders or Congress mandated judicial
365 In this regard, it is worth recalling Heather Gerken and Michael Kang’s critique of
Rave’s account of politicians as fiduciaries in the election law setting.  As they point out,
“even when one digs down into the specifics, Rave’s arguments [about institutional design]
are familiar.” See Gerken & Kang, supra note 352, at 87.
366 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 19 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed., 2d
ed. 1890); see also Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political
Ethics of Francis Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339, 348, 368 (1992) (discussing Lieber’s “effort to
coordinate individual rights with the duties of citizens and public officers in a constitu-
tional democracy”).
367 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 88 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed., 2d
ed. 1890); see also Carrington, supra note 366, at 368.
368 See Carrington, supra note 366, at 370–71 (“What [Lieber] sought to provide was an
intellectual process or a discipline for the consideration of public issues . . . .”).
369 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Consti-
tutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779–86 (1991).
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review along fiduciary lines, federal courts would be bound to employ it.  But
the interpretive case for fiduciary government is unconvincing.  The solu-
tions to our collective political problems do not lie in treating all law as fidu-
ciary law.
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